Group of Eight (G8)
The Group of Eight's (G8's) roots lie in the oil crisis and global economic recession of the early 1970s. In 1973, these challenges prompted the US to form the Library Group - an informal gathering of senior financial officials from Europe, Japan and the US.
At the instigation of the French, the 1975 meeting drew in heads of government. The delegates agreed to meet annually. The six nations involved became known as the G6, and later the G7 and G8 after the respective entries of Canada (1976) and Russia (1998).
Though the G8 was set up as a forum for economic and trade matters, politics crept onto the agenda in the late 1970s. Recent summits have considered the developing world, global security, Middle East peace and reconstruction in Iraq.
G8 members can agree on policies and can set objectives, but compliance with these is voluntary. The G8 has clout in other world bodies because of the economic and political muscle of its members.
The 2005 meeting held in Gleneagles, Scotland, UK, under the UK Presidency placed Climate Change and Africa as joint priority agenda items. Throughout the preceding year a series of events were held in preparation for the final summit in July.
The Gleneagles Summit itself was distracted by other events and as a result limited progress was made in discussions on climate change. However, it was agreed that the topics of energy and climate change would continue to be discussed at future G8 meetings. The meeting in St Petersburg, Russia in 2006 will focus on global energy security and climate change will be discussed further at future meetings in Germany (2007) and Japan (2008).
Energy ministers representing the G8 nations acknowledged that the world would witness a "significant increase" in energy consumption in the 21st century and that diverse energy sources, including nuclear energy, will be crucial. The energy ministers met in Moscow in March 2006, ahead of the G8 Summit in July. In a joint statement, the energy ministers acknowledge that fossil fuels will "remain the basis of the world energy industry" throughout the first half of the 21st century, despite alternative energy sources. The statement recognizes the need for diversity among energy sources to "reduce energy security risks" worldwide. It also stresses that "for those countries that wish, wide-scale development of safe and secure nuclear energy is crucial for long-term environmentally sustainable diversification of energy supply".
The G8 endorsed the use of nuclear energy and said it supports the development of innovative nuclear power systems. In a joint statement on global energy security, the G8 leaders said, "we recognize that G8 members pursue different ways to achieve energy security and climate protection goals ... Those of us who have or are considering plans for the use and/or development of safe and secure nuclear energy believe that its development will contribute to global energy security". The G8 - meeting in St Petersburg - also reaffirmed the objective to allow reliable access of all countries to nuclear energy on a competitive basis, but consistent with non-proliferation standards. It said it intended to make additional joint efforts to ensure reliable access to low-enriched uranium (LEU) for reactor fuel and spent fuel recycling. On a general level, the G8 said it would take a number of measures to enhance energy security including improving the investment climate in the energy sector, diversifying the energy mix, and addressing climate change and sustainable development.
Individual government policies:
USA:
Energy Policy Act 2005
After much preliminary debate the Energy Policy Act 2005 comfortably passed both houses - 74-26 in the Senate and 275-156 in the House. It includes incentives for the nuclear power industry including:
Also US$1.25 billion was authorized for an advanced high-temperature reactor (Next Generation Nuclear Plant) at the Idaho National Laboratory, capable of cogenerating hydrogen. Overall more than US$2 billion was provided for hydrogen demonstration projects.
In 2006 it was spelled out that the 6000 MWe eligible for production tax credits would be divided pro-rata among those applicants which filed COL applications by the end of 2008, which commence construction of advanced plants by 2014, and which enter service by 2021.
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
In February 2006 the US government announced a Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) through which it "will work with other nations possessing advanced nuclear technologies to develop new proliferation-resistant recycling technologies in order to produce more energy, reduce waste and minimize proliferation concerns. Additionally, these partner nations will develop a fuel services program to provide nuclear fuel to developing nations allowing them to enjoy the benefits of abundant sources of clean, safe nuclear energy in a cost-effective manner in exchange for their commitment to forgo enrichment and reprocessing activities, also alleviating proliferation concerns." This is seen as a commercial and procedural complement to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, which also addresses global warming concerns.
GNEP goals include reducing US dependence on imported fossil fuels, and building a new generation of nuclear power plants in the USA. Two significant new elements in the strategy are new reprocessing technologies which separate all transuranic elements together (and not Pu on its own) - starting with the proven UREX+ process, and Advanced Burner (fast) Reactors to consume the result of this while generating power. (See also GNEP web site ).
See WNA Info Paper on USA.
RUSSIA:
Several reactors are under construction, but funding availability means that only two or three are likely to meet commissioning schedules. A mid 2006 announcement pledged US$665 million in 2007 towards completing Vogodonsk-2, Kalinin-4 and Beloyarsk-4, but did not mention Balakovo 5 & 6. Completion of Kursk-5 remains in doubt.
In line with the US Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, the head of Rosatom early in 2006 reiterated that it is prepared to host four types of international nuclear fuel cycle service centres as joint ventures financed by other countries. These would be secure and maybe under IAEA control. First, a uranium enrichment centre - one of four or five worldwide. The second would be for reprocessing and storage of used nuclear fuel. The third would deal with training and certification of personnel, especially for emerging nuclear states. In this context there is a need for harmonized international standards, uniform safeguards and joint international centres. The fourth would be for R&D and to integrate new scientific achievements.
In addition, Rosatom is keen to be involved in international projects for Generation IV reactor development and is keen to have international participation in fast neutron reactor development, as well as joint proposals for MOX fuel fabrication.
See WNA Info Paper on Russia.
CANADA:
The federal government's approach to energy policy has gradually evolved over the last two decades to a stronger market-driven and less interventionist approach to energy development. In recent years environmental pressures are shaping the energy policy agenda. Environmental protection, energy efficiency and the development of new alternative sources of energy remain high on the list of federal objectives for the energy sector. The focus now is on achieving a balance between economic, environmental and security objectives, i.e., sustainable development. In December 2002, Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol reaffirming its commitment to work with the international community to address this global problem. Meeting Kyoto targets is high on the federal government agenda.
With respect to nuclear energy, the federal government is supportive of the nuclear energy option for Canada and views nuclear energy as an important component of a diversified energy mix. The federal government provides funding for Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's (AECL) nuclear R&D programme. The federal government also regulates the development and application of nuclear energy in Canada. Decision-making responsibility for planning, construction and operation of nuclear plants reside with the provinces and provincial electric power utilities. There are currently no firm plans to build additional nuclear plants in Canada although there is growing recognition that nuclear energy will be required to meet future demand and at the same time meet climate change and air quality commitments. Servicing of existing reactors and the refurbishment of some of the units is the present focus of the nuclear utilities.
The Saskatchewan government actively encourages and supports uranium mining in the Province where it is found to be environmentally acceptable. This reversed a previous policy of the New Democratic Party in the early 1990s to phase out uranium mining. The Government recognized that the jobs brought to the provincial economy by uranium mining were too important to be eliminated by doctrinaire considerations and that the environmental impact of mining could be minimized.
Facing an impending power shortage, the Ontario government in October 2005 agreed with Bruce Power to refurbish its four oldest reactors - collectively known as Bruce A, each 769 MWe - rather than the longer process of building new ones to replace them.
See WNA Info Paper on Canada.
JAPAN:
Japanese energy policy has been driven by considerations of energy security and the need to minimize dependence on current imports. The main elements regarding nuclear power are:
In March 2002 the Japanese government announced that it would rely heavily on nuclear energy to achieve greenhouse gas emission reduction goals set by the Kyoto Protocol. A 10-year energy plan, submitted in July 2001 to the Minister of Economy Trade & Industry (METI), was endorsed by cabinet. It called for an increase in nuclear power generation by about 30% (13,000 MWe), with the expectation that utilities would have 9 to 12 new nuclear plants operating by 2011. At present Japan has 54 reactors totalling 45,520 MWe on line, with 3 (3300 MWe) under construction and 12 (14,400 MWe) planned.
In June 2002, Japan's upper house approved a new Energy Policy Law by 206 to 27. The law sets out the basic principles of energy security and stable supply, and the responsibilities of the national government and local public corporations, apparently giving greater authority to the government in establishing the energy infrastructure for economic growth. The law also seeks greater efficiency in consumption, a further move away from dependence on fossil fuels, and market liberalisation. It requires the government to report annually to the Diet on energy policy and its implementation.
In November 2002, the Japanese government announced that it would introduce a tax on coal for the first time, alongside those on oil, gas and LPG in METI's special energy account, to give a total net tax increase of some JPY 10 billion from October 2003. At the same time METI will reduce its power-source development tax, including that applying to nuclear generation, by 15.7% - amounting to JPY 50 billion per year. While the taxes in the special energy account were originally designed to improve Japan's energy supply mix, the change is part of the first phase of addressing Kyoto goals by reducing carbon emissions. The second phase, planned for 2005-07, will involve a more comprehensive environmental tax system, including a carbon tax.
These developments, despite some scandal in 2002 connected with records of equipment inspections at nuclear power plants, are expected to pave the way for an increased role for nuclear energy.
In 2004 Japan's Atomic Industrial Forum released a report on the future prospects for nuclear power in the country. It brought together a number of considerations including 60% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions and 20% population reduction but with constant GDP. Nuclear generating capacity in 2050 is seen as 90 GWe. This means doubling both nuclear generating capacity and nuclear share to about 60% of total power produced. In addition, some 20 GW (thermal) of nuclear heat will be utilized for hydrogen production. Hydrogen is expected to supply 10% of consumed energy and 70% of this will come from nuclear plants.
In mid 2005 the Nuclear Energy Policy Planning Division of the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy instigated a 2-year feasibility study on development of next-generation LWRs. The new designs, based on ABWR and APWR, are to lead to a 20% reduction in construction and generation costs and a 20% reduction in spent fuel quantity, with improved safety, 3-year construction and 60-year life. Projected sizes range from 800 to 1700 MWe.
In July 2005 the Atomic Energy Commission reaffirmed policy directions for nuclear power in Japan, while confirming that the immediate focus would be on LWRs. The main elements are that a "30-40% share or more" shall be the target for nuclear power in total generation after 2030, including replacement of current plants with advanced light water reactors. Fast breeder reactors will be introduced commercially, but not until about 2050. Used fuel will be reprocessed domestically to recover fissile material for use in MOX fuel. Disposal of high-level wastes will be addressed after 2010.
See WNA Info Paper on Japan.
FRANCE:
In 1999 a parliamentary debate reaffirmed three main planks of French energy policy: security of supply (France imports more than half its energy), respect for the environment (especially re greenhouse gases) and proper attention to radioactive waste management. It was noted that natural gas had no economic advantage over nuclear for base-load power, and its prices were very volatile. Despite "intense efforts" there was no way renewables and energy conservation measures could replace nuclear energy in the foreseeable future.
Early in 2003 France's first national energy debate was announced, in response to a "strong demand from the French people", 70% of whom have identified themselves as being poorly informed on energy questions. A poll had showed that 67% of people think that environmental protection is the single most important energy policy goal. However, 58% thought that nuclear power causes climate change while only 46% thought that coal burning does so.
The debate was to prepare the way to define the energy mix for the next 30 years in the context of sustainable development at a European and at a global level. The role of nuclear power was central to this, along with specific decisions concerning the European Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR), and defining the role of renewable energies in the production of electricity, in thermal uses and transport.
In May 2006 the EdF board approved construction of a new 1630 MWe EPR unit at Flamanville, Normandy, alongside two 1300 MWe units. The decision is seen as "an essential step in renewing EDF's nuclear generation mix". Italian utility ENEL will have a 12.5% share in the new plant, taking rights to 200 MWe of its capacity and being involved in design, construction and operation of it.
In January 2006 the President announced that the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) was to embark upon designing a prototype Generation IV reactor to be operating in 2020, bringing forward the timeline for this by some five years. France has been pursuing three Gen IV technologies: gas-cooled fast reactor, sodium-cooled fast reactor, and very high temperature reactor (gas-cooled). While Areva has been working on the last, the main interest in it has been in the USA, as well as South Africa and China. CEA is likely to focus on the fast reactors on the basis that they will produce less waste and will better exploit uranium resources, including the 220,000 tonnes of depleted uranium and some reprocessed uranium stockpiled in France.
If the CEA embarks on the sodium-cooled design, there is plenty of experience to draw on and they would go straight to a demonstration plant - the main innovation would be substituting gas for water as the intermediate coolant. If the gas-cooled fast reactor is selected, that is entirely new and would require a small prototype as first step - the form of its fuel would need to be unique. Neither would operate at a high enough temperature for hydrogen production, so pursuing either of them would leave the very high temperature R&D to the USA and East Asia. The CEA's current plan is to spend about EUR 40 million per year on Gen IV R&D, about half of this on the gas-cooled design, but the new emphasis will require a considerable increase in budget, even with some foreign involvement.
See WNA Info Paper on France.
UK:
Until the 1980s, UK government policy was clearly to have nuclear energy providing an increasing proportion of UK electricity, with reprocessing of spent fuel to recover fissile materials and increase the utilization of uranium. In a 1988 white paper uncertainties were expressed about cost, though the value of nuclear power in other respects was acknowledged. In 1989 when the electricity system was privatized and deregulation began the government announced that it would keep all nuclear power generation in the public sector. Then in 1995 a review of nuclear power was published as a white paper, confirming the government's commitment to it but stating that no public sector support for building new nuclear plants was warranted in the deregulated market.
The nuclear generating plants apart from Magnox were transferred into the private sector in 1996, under British Energy. The state-owned British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL) took ownership of all the Magnox power stations as well as the UK fuel cycle facilities. BNFL subsequently bought Westinghouse and other international nuclear engineering and services companies.
In March 2001 the UK electricity market took a major further step in deregulation and with considerable overcapacity due to recent construction of much gas-fired plant, wholesale prices declined to a level that was below production cost for British Energy. BE was saddled with expensive reprocessing contracts with BNFL (at 0.45 p/kWh - about six times what spent fuel arrangements cost in USA) and also the climate change levy (at up to 0.15 p/kWh - though its nuclear plants do not emit CO2). In 2003 the reprocessing contracts were renegotiated to give some relief, but this became contentious with the EU.
In 2006 a review of energy policy was undertaken, the result of which has put the replacement of the country's nuclear power stations back on the national agenda, due both to energy security concerns and the need to limit carbon emissions. Any new plants would be financed and built by the private sector, and Areva has said that it could build them by 2017 if planning procedures were improved and government decisions were made on wastes. A review of the licensing process for new designs is under way. Most of the nuclear plants now producing 20% of UK electricity will close by 2020.
See WNA Info Paper on UK.
GERMANY:
In October 1998 a coalition government was formed between the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party, the latter having polled only 6.7% of the vote. As a result, these two parties agreed to change the law to establish the eventual phasing out of nuclear power.
Long drawn-out "consensus talks" with the electric utilities were intended to establish a timetable for phase out, with the Greens threatening unilateral curtailment of licenses without compensation if agreement was not reached. All operating nuclear plants have unlimited licences with strong legal guarantees.
In June 2000 a compromise was announced which saved face for the government and secured the uninterrupted operation of the nuclear plants for many years ahead. The agreement, while limiting plant lifetime to some degree, averted the risk of any enforced plant closures during the term of the present government.
In particular, the agreement put a cap of 2623 billion kWh on lifetime production by all 19 operating reactors, equivalent to an average lifetime of 32 years (less than the 35 years sought by industry). Two key elements were a government commitment to respect the rights of utilities to operate existing plants, and a guarantee that this operation and related waste disposal will be protected from any "politically-motivated interference".
Other elements included: a government commitment not to introduce any "one-sided" economic or taxation measures, a recognition by the government of the high safety standards of German nuclear plants and a guarantee not to erode those standards, the resumption of spent fuel transports for reprocessing in France and UK for five years or until contracts expire, and maintenance of two waste repository projects (at Konrad and Gorleben).
In June 2001 the leaders of the Red-Green coalition government and the four main energy companies signed an agreement to give effect to this 2000 compromise. The companies' undertaking to limit the operational lives of the reactors to an average of 32 yearsmeant that two of the least economic ones - Stade and Obrigheim - were shut down in 2003 and 2005 respectively, and the one non-operational reactor (Muelheim-Kaerlich, 1219 MWe) is being decommissioned from 2003. It also prohibited the construction of new nuclear power plants for the time being and introduces the principle of on-site storage for spent fuel.
The agreement is a pragmatic compromise which limits political interference while providing a basis and plenty of time for formulation of a national energy policy. An industry leader reminded his government that "Reliable and cost-effective energy supply must remain an important component of German economic policy". Some speculation has centred on the future of the agreement, and the revised Atomic Energy Act which followed it, under any new government. Parliamentary opposition party leaders have said that they will reverse the decision when they can.
If the present policy continues beyond the 2006 federal election, several large plants will be forced to close, creating a significant supply problem and raising concern from industrial consumers. Utilities are preparing for a change in policy after the election however, extending all 17 reactor lifetimes initially to 40 years (from average 32 years) and then individually seeking extensions to 60 years as in the USA.
Earlier, the utilities said that while they had achieved their stated goal, "to be able to carry on operating the German nuclear power plants under economically-acceptable conditions", the deal was still a second-best solution and completely failed to address the need for "comprehensive consensus" on energy policy generally. They pointed to reasons for nuclear energy needing to remain part of the German energy mix long-term, and the importance of actively maintaining the option for future generations by adequate R&D on the new European Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR) design, a Franco-German project.
The major SPD, though formally anti-nuclear, has its chief priority as countering unemployment. Other aspects of the coalition energy policy are an energy tax and continued subsidy for the coal industry.
Germany's other main fuel for base-load electricity is brown coal (which produces about 1.25 tonnes of carbon dioxide per MWh). Over half the country's electricity now comes from coal. Arising from the Kyoto accord, and as part of the differentiated EU "bubble", Germany is committed to a 21% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2010.
A major element in the federal government's war of attrition through 1999-2000 against the nuclear utilities was a law retrospectively to tax funds amounting to DM 50 billion which have been contributed by electricity users and set aside in trust as provision for waste management, decommissioning nuclear power plants and rehabilitating lignite mines. Early in 1999 industry promptly served notice that this would be vigorously contested as "a blatant breach of German constitutional rights and legal principles", as depletion of these funds by some DM 25 billion through the tax will leave future generations liable for much of the future costs. However, despite a scathing attack on it by the Chancellor, Mr Schroeder, in cabinet, the tax measure was approved by the upper house on the last day that the new coalition enjoyed a majority there.
See WNA Info Paper on Germany.
ITALY:
Following a referendum in November 1987, provoked by the Chernobyl accident 18 months earlier, work on the nuclear program was largely stopped. In 1988 the government resolved to halt all nuclear construction, shut the remaining reactors and decommission them from 1990. As well as the operating plants, two new nuclear BWR plants were almost complete and six locally-designed PWR plants were planned. ENEA (formerly CNEN) also closed various fuel cycle facilities.
The last Energy Plan approved by the Government dates back to August 1998. It focused on a set of actions capable of yielding substantial results in terms of energy conservation, environmental protection, development of domestic energy sources, diversification of imported energy sources and their origins, and safeguarding the competitiveness of the production system. Since 1998, the Italian Government has issued no further comprehensive energy documents. A five-years nuclear moratorium, following a popular referendum, which took place in 1987, officially expired in December 1993.
In 1999 SOGIN was set up to take over all ENEL's and ENEA's nuclear assets and be responsible for decommissioning them. It was also to take responsibility for all nuclear wastes.
In 2004 a new Energy Law opened up the possibility of joint venture with foreign companies in relation to nuclear power plants and importing electricity from them. This resulted from a clear change in public opinion, especially among younger people favouring nuclear power for Italy.
In 2005 Electricite de France and ENEL signed a cooperation agreement, which gives ENEL some 200 MWe from the new Flamanville-3 EPR nuclear reactor (1700 MWe) in France, and potentially another 1000 MWe or so from the next five such units built. As well as the 12.5% share, ENEL will also be involved in design, construction and operation of the plants, which will enhance Italy's power security and improve its economics A major benefit will be in rebuilding Italy's nuclear skills and competence. ENEL is expected to pay about EUR 350 million for its share in the project.
See WNA Info Paper on Italy