

## Roger Howsley, Consultant, World Institute for Nuclear Security The World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) - Promoting security best practices

I should like to thank the World Nuclear Association for this excellent opportunity to bring the Symposium up to date on the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS), a new international forum to be formed for nuclear security professionals to exchange best practices, with the aim of improving nuclear security worldwide.

I also hope it will be an opportunity to seek your views and ideas, now and after the Symposium, given the vast experience and knowledge in this room, and that WINS will provide a forum for your security professionals to promote and share their own areas of excellence for the benefit of all.

It is important to recognise that WINS is entirely consistent with the purposes and methods of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism which was founded by the United States and Russia in 2006 and now counts 70 States amongst its members.

One of the guiding principles of the Global Initiative to which States have agreed is as follows:

“Participating in or hosting expert-level scenario based exercises to test capabilities, develop new operational concepts and enhance preparedness, as well as expert-level workshops to share best practices...”.

WINS exists to help achieve these broad objectives.

I suspect that we are all completely aware of the growing and sustained threat of international terrorism. We need to remember that the formation of WANO (the World Association of Nuclear Operators) was in response to the Chernobyl disaster. And the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (the US forerunner of WANO) was established in response to recommendations by the Kemeny Commission Report, following the investigation of the Three Mile Island Unit event.

As an industry, we must not wait for a dirty bomb, a sabotage attempt or the explosion of fissile materials before we take collaborative action to identify and share best security practice by supporting WINS.

But there other, less stark reasons, why it makes sense to have a forum like WINS. I have spent most of my career as a Nuclear Security Director and Chairman of the Police Force responsible for the dedicated armed response at nuclear sites in the UK, and in my opinion it really is time for those in the nuclear security field to create more of the opportunities for professional development and dialogue that are so taken for granted by our colleagues in the field of nuclear safety. We have a great deal to learn from their techniques of learning from experience, sustaining operational excellence and promoting a strong culture.

But let me first summarise the WINS journey so far.

Three organisations have been behind the WINS concept: the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), and the US Department of Energy (USDOE). It is they that have had the vision to promote the ideas behind WINS. It is they that have thought through the benefits of such an organisation. It is they that should be congratulated for their contribution to such an important subject as nuclear security. It is they that formed the Coordination Team to plan and execute international workshops and strategy meetings to test the WINS concept over the last 3 years and I am proud to have been asked to join the team in March.

Very early on, the team recognised the importance of consultation with the IAEA, which has its own, very successful Security Programme. I had the honour last November to be asked by the IAEA to chair a review of its Security Programme, looking back to 2002 when it first started, and forward over the next few years. I can tell you that the IAEA security team, under Anita Nilsson's leadership, is doing and has done a fantastic job. But they would be the first to say that they have limited resources based on voluntary Member State contributions and have focused their interactions, quite understandably, with Member States. We jointly believe that what is necessary is outreach to operators and facility licensees, both governmental and private, who are almost always the organisations that are legally responsible for implementing security.

And this view was echoed by the IAEA's Director General, Dr Mohammed ElBaradei, who gave his endorsement in June this year for the establishment of WINS.

Dr ElBaradei expressed his support and endorsement for WINS, being "confident that establishing a forum to help share and promote best practices ... will improve nuclear security and contribute to and complement the efforts of the IAEA."

The current status of WINS is that the NTI Board of Directors confirmed in April that it would provide WINS with a foundation grant to allow it to be established as a not-for-profit organisation based in Vienna, and there have been pledges of support and funding from other organisations. We are continuing to talk to governments and organisations around the world that have responsibilities for security to gauge their interest in participating in and supporting WINS and the response has been encouraging. And we have instructed lawyers to begin the legal proceedings to establish WINS. Subsequently, we will be setting up business premises, business systems and recruiting the necessary staff in Vienna, so it is an interesting and busy time for WINS.

Before talking about what WINS will do in practice, I would like to tell you about some of the support that we have received from private companies, regulators and government-owned organisations. It has been interesting to see the reasons for support, each organisation viewing WINS from their perspective and how WINS could add value to and benefit their organisation, in addition to a feeling that WINS will contribute to a greater sense of confidence in the security arrangements elsewhere in the world.

Let me start with my "home" team in the UK. The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority is the organisation that now owns 19 nuclear sites in the UK; sites previously owned and operated by BNFL and the UKAEA. In total, the sites store and process over 100 tonnes of separated plutonium and 3 tonnes of highly enriched uranium, as well as a very significant proportion of the total nuclear waste legacy in the UK. The NDA is currently selecting contractors to manage the sites on its behalf, very much as the USDOE does on its sites.

The NDA has a legal responsibility to satisfy itself that its contractors are using best practices in discharging their contractual commitments and sees WINS as a forum for helping identify better implementation methods. In that sense WINS can help the NDA discharge its own responsibilities. And given that we are observing an increase in the international composition of the contractors' teams bidding for work in the UK, with joint teams from the US, from the UK, from France, for example, the NDA recognises that it makes increasing sense to think about security implementation in an international context, with the best international practices being adopted to meet nationally defined regulatory requirements.

And opportunities for international benchmarking grow all the time given that an increasing number of contractors and suppliers work alongside one another to service the growing international nuclear market. The Finnish nuclear regulator (STUK), which strongly supports WINS, has highlighted that the construction of the Finnish EPR reactor involves over 1000 companies from over 20 countries. So international comparisons and benchmarking will become the norm, including for security.

Secondly, let me highlight the supportive remarks of the Chairman of British Energy, the operator of all but two of the UK's nuclear generating stations. Sir Adrian Montague rightly identifies the immense benefits that have been derived by British Energy from being a member of WANO, and the realisation that a safety event anywhere in the world will impact public confidence, regulatory attitudes and investor sentiment, affecting every industry participant.

He notes that the ability to share good security practice has in previous times been more the prerogative of the regulators, but that WINS has the potential to fill the gap in international cooperation, providing an effective and trusted means by which operators could work together to deliver a more secure industry, particularly as the nuclear industry once again moves into an investment phase.

And this last remark concerning investment is extremely important.

Few people would challenge the role of the IAEA to establish the international framework of security

guidelines and recommendations, or the role of governments to set security policy or national authorities to regulate the nuclear industry. But there is something of which we must not lose sight.

As this audience will well know, a significant percentage of the existing nuclear reactors, enrichment, conversion and fuel fabrication facilities in operation today is owned and operated by private companies and the international trend is one of increasing privatisation of nuclear operations. Private companies with private shareholders. Shareholders that have invested hundreds of billions of pounds in their facilities and are now looking to finance the predicted expansion of nuclear power in the decades ahead. Huge investments will be necessary and the financiers will demand a thorough and comprehensive risk assessment. So confidence that the security arrangements are effective and efficient and properly benchmarked should become the norm, as it is for so many other aspects of corporate performance.

The legal accountability and ownership of security performance are of fundamental importance.

That starts with good corporate governance, because nearly all Boards of nuclear organisations, whether in the private sector or in government, have a legal duty to assess risk and take appropriate measures to mitigate risk. So the priority is to improve the engagement of Boards with security issues: getting security onto the Board agenda. Driven from the top of the organisation by the Board and CEO. Integrated into Corporate policy, aligned with business objectives. Using clearly defined functional plans for security with properly costed targets, subject to performance metrics and reporting.

The key message is that managing security is very little different from managing any other function, but very often security is seen as different and that is a mistake. Boards need to address security in the same way as safety with properly constructed oversight programmes, using a variety of activities driven by the Board to oversee the quality of security, including, importantly, learning from experience inside the organisation and from peers outside the organisation facing the same or similar issues.

It is interesting to see how Corporate Governance and

Social Responsibility reporting have evolved over the last 15 years, initially focusing on financial probity, but now increasingly embracing safety performance, environmental performance and overall risk management. It is time for security to be included in the portfolio of risk assessment by the Boards of all our nuclear organisations.

So this is one area where WINS expects to be active, but there are others, including helping to define meaningful security performance metrics, learning from operational experience and taking best practices from other sectors. Perhaps we have things to learn about managing the insider threat from the gold and diamond sector, where the threat from insiders is higher than the perceived threat in our industry.

So as we look forward, we are looking for champions and leaders to help set the nuclear security agenda for the future. We are looking at WINS being established in 2008 and setting to work.

If you would like more information about supporting or joining WINS there are links to WINS on a variety of websites including [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org), [www.inmm.org](http://www.inmm.org) and of course, [www.wins.org](http://www.wins.org).