Turning Nuclear Ambition into Action: Q&A with Dr Jonathan Cobb, author of World Nuclear Outlook Report 2026
Ahead of the publication of the World Nuclear Outlook Report at World Nuclear Symposium 2026, we sat down with the author, Dr Jonathan Cobb, Senior Programme Lead, Climate at World Nuclear Association for an interview.
The World Nuclear Outlook Report assesses the readiness of individual countries to contribute to the goal of tripling nuclear capacity by 2050.
1. For readers unfamiliar with it, what is the World Nuclear Outlook Report and why does it matter?
The first edition of the World Nuclear Outlook Report set out to answer a fundamental question: if governments achieve the nuclear energy targets and ambitions they have established individually, would their combined efforts be sufficient to meet the global goal set out in the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy?
The declaration was launched at COP28 in Dubai in 2023, when 25 countries committed to supporting the goal of tripling global nuclear capacity by 2050—from approximately 400 GWe in 2020 to around 1200 GWe. The coalition has since expanded to 38 countries, demonstrating growing international recognition of nuclear energy’s contribution to clean, secure and affordable energy systems.
Our analysis found that national targets and identified projects could collectively deliver more than 1400 GWe of nuclear capacity by 2050, comfortably exceeding the global tripling goal. However, identifying sufficient ambition is only the first step.
The 2026 edition will therefore begin measuring the readiness of countries to deliver on that goal, how effectively they are translating their ambitions into practical delivery. Are governments establishing credible long-term roadmaps? Do regulators have the resources and capabilities required to license new projects? Are appropriate financing and delivery models being developed? Are sites, supply chains and workforces being prepared?
That is why the report matters. It provides a common framework through which governments, industry and other stakeholders can assess whether global nuclear ambitions are being converted into the policies, projects and investments required to deliver them.
2. What does the World Nuclear Outlook Report tell us about progress towards tripling global nuclear capacity by 2050?
It is still relatively early to judge progress. The declaration was signed less that three years ago, and the first World Nuclear Outlook Report established a baseline against which future developments can be assessed. Nuclear projects also have long development and construction times, so the effects of decisions taken since COP28 will not yet be fully visible.
Nevertheless, the report gives us three important messages.
First, tripling global nuclear capacity remains achievable. The first edition found that national targets, continued operation of existing reactors and the global pipeline of new projects could collectively deliver 1446 GWe by 2050.
Second, much of that capacity is not yet associated with projects that are under construction or ready to begin construction. Around 82 GWe is under construction, with a further 114 GWe classified as planned and 289 GWe as proposed. Another 559 GWe depended on additional capacity being developed to meet national government targets. This demonstrates the scale of the implementation challenge. A substantial proportion of the capacity required in 2050 still needs to progress from a policy objective to an identified programme, and then from a programme to a financed and licensed project.
The expansion of the declaration from 25 original signatories to 38 countries is an encouraging indication that political support is broadening. But the central conclusion remains that tripling is achievable only if ambition is followed rapidly by implementation. The next five years will be particularly important. Decisions taken during this period will determine the volume of nuclear construction that can be achieved during the 2030s and 2040s.
3. Which countries are showing the strongest momentum for new nuclear deployment?
China and the United States illustrate two very different forms of momentum.
China has the clearest construction momentum. It has maintained a continuous programme of nuclear expansion over the past 25 years, increasing its operable capacity from around 2 GWe in 2001 to more than 65 GWe today. It currently has 37 reactors under construction, totalling more than 40 GWe, as well as a substantial pipeline of planned and proposed projects. If this programme continues, China’s nuclear capacity could exceed 300 GWe by 2050.
The United States has the world’s largest operating nuclear fleet, comprising 94 reactors with around 100 GWe of capacity, and has established an objective of reaching 400 GWe by 2050. However, it currently has no commercial nuclear power reactors under construction.
There is significant activity in the United States—including reactor life extensions, power uprates, potential restarts, advanced reactor demonstrations and plans for new large reactors—but this activity will need to develop rapidly into a sustained programme of construction if the 2050 goal is to be achieved.
4. What are the biggest gaps between ambition and delivery?
The largest gap is between announcing a national target and establishing a programme capable of delivering it.
A credible target needs to be supported by a clear roadmap setting out the expected scale, timing and sequence of new projects.
Financing remains one of the most important challenges. Nuclear plants are long-lived infrastructure assets, but they require substantial investment during development and construction. Governments and markets therefore need financing models that reduce the cost of capital, provide investors with sufficient revenue certainty and allocate construction risks to the parties best able to manage them.
There are also potential constraints in regulatory capacity, project management, skilled workforces and supply chains. A tripling of global capacity will require a major expansion in the manufacture of reactor components, nuclear fuel production and the availability of experienced engineering and construction personnel. Regulatory organizations will need sufficient resources to assess more projects without compromising independence or safety.
Finally, countries need to make timely decisions about sites, grid connections, fuel arrangements, waste management and the long-term operation of existing reactors. The technology required to expand nuclear generation already exists. The principal challenge is creating the institutional and commercial conditions that allow projects to proceed predictably and repeatedly.
5. How is rising electricity demand changing the global nuclear outlook?
The global tripling target was established in anticipation of a very substantial increase in electricity demand.
This demand is rising for three main reasons. The first is the need to improve access to electricity. Hundreds of millions of people still have no electricity access, while many more experience unreliable or inadequate supplies. Expanding access is essential for economic development, public services and improved quality of life.
The second is economic and industrial growth. As economies develop, electricity consumption generally increases. New sources of demand—including artificial intelligence, data centres, advanced manufacturing and digital infrastructure—are adding to this growth.
The third is electrification. Replacing the direct use of fossil fuels in transport, buildings and industry with low-carbon electricity is one of the most effective ways to reduce emissions. Electricity demand is therefore expected to grow more rapidly than overall energy demand.
It is useful to refer to the COP31 electrification target because it demonstrates the potential scale and speed of this transformation. The COP31 Presidency, led jointly by Türkiye and Australia, has proposed raising the proportion of global final energy demand met by electricity from just over 20% today to 35% by 2035.
Achieving that objective will require very large quantities of additional low-carbon electricity. Nuclear energy can provide reliable generation around the clock, supporting both expanding electricity systems and the increased use of intermittent renewable generation.
Nuclear technologies can also contribute where direct electrification is difficult. Reactors can provide steam and high-temperature process heat for industrial applications and could support the production of hydrogen, synthetic fuels and other low-carbon energy carriers. Nuclear’s future role therefore extends beyond electricity generation alone.
6. What does the report tell us about the future role of small modular reactors and advanced nuclear technologies?
Most of the new nuclear capacity currently under construction, planned or proposed consists of large reactors. These are proven technologies, and their scale allows countries seeking substantial increases in capacity to add large volumes of reliable generation with a relatively small number of units.
Small modular reactors are therefore more likely to complement large reactors than to replace them. Interest in SMRs is growing for three principal reasons.
First, their smaller output may be better suited to countries or regions where a single large reactor would be too great for the electricity system or local level of demand.
Second, the lower capital requirement for an individual unit, together with the potential for shorter construction periods, may make SMRs more compatible with the financing options available to some utilities and industrial customers. Factory manufacture and repeated deployment could also create opportunities for standardization and cost reduction, although these benefits will need to be demonstrated through commercial-scale deployment.
Third, SMRs and other advanced technologies may be particularly well suited to applications beyond conventional grid electricity. These include industrial process heat, district heating, desalination, hydrogen production, remote grids and potentially marine propulsion.
The decisive issue will be moving from technology development and demonstration to repeat deployment. This will require standardized designs, efficient licensing, functioning manufacturing supply chains and sufficiently large orderbooks to support factory production.
7. As you are researching the 2026 edition of the World Nuclear Outlook Report, have you found anything suprising?
It was pleasantly surprising that, having categorized countries into five different groups representing nuclear growth journeys, combining the individual country readiness analysis revealed common issues within those individual groupings.
But even looking across all the groups there were issues that affect them all. The challenge is almost always implementation. Countries need clear programmes, stable policies, capable institutions, workable financing models and organizations with responsibility for delivery. The technology is available; what matters is whether the conditions are in place to deploy it.
The research continually reinforces the conclusion that the principal constraint on nuclear growth is not a shortage of ambition or technological options. It is the ability to sustain the political, institutional and industrial commitment required to deliver complex programmes over several decades.
8. Which developments have most improved the outlook for nuclear energy over the past year?
One of the most significant developments has occurred outside the nuclear sector itself. The disruption to oil and gas supplies associated with conflict in the Middle East and restrictions on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has demonstrated the vulnerability of economies that remain heavily dependent on imported fossil fuels.
The International Energy Agency described the disruption as the largest oil-supply shock in the history of the global oil market.
Climate change remains a fundamental reason for shifting from fossil fuels to clean, low-carbon alternatives. However, the recent events in the Middle East and the impacts of the Russian-Ukraine war have reinforced the energy-security and economic arguments for making the same transition. Countries are increasingly seeking energy systems that are less exposed to volatile fuel prices, geopolitical disruption and vulnerable international supply routes.
Nuclear energy can make a major contribution to that transition because it provides reliable domestic electricity generation with comparatively small and readily stockpiled fuel requirements. It can also help replace fossil fuels in difficult-to-decarbonize sectors through industrial heat, hydrogen and synthetic fuel production.
The continued expansion of the tripling declaration is another encouraging development. Belgium, Brazil, China and Italy joined the declaration in March 2026, bringing the number of endorsing countries to 38. This growing coalition demonstrates that support for nuclear energy is no longer concentrated in a small group of traditional nuclear countries.
9. What are the key risks that could slow progress towards global nuclear growth targets?
Building a coalition of countries with the ambition to support a tripling of global nuclear capacity has been a major achievement. The principal risk now is that words are not converted into action with sufficient urgency.
Nuclear programmes require long-term preparation. The reactors that will need to enter operation during the late 2030s and 2040s depend on decisions being taken during the next five years. Delays in establishing policies, selecting sites, preparing licences or agreeing financing arrangements could have consequences that extend for decades.
Financing is a key issue, governments will need to establish frameworks capable of attracting investment at an affordable cost. Sufficient skilled labour, specialist manufacturing capacity and nuclear fuel-cycle services must be developed to avoid constraints on deployment.
Policy stability is another important requirement. Nuclear projects extend across multiple electoral and economic cycles. They require sustained political commitment, clear institutional responsibility and confidence that fundamental policy decisions will not repeatedly be reversed.
The nuclear industry of course needs to avoid the risks associated with poor project execution. Cost overruns and delays on individual projects would undermine investor, government and public confidence far beyond the project concerned. The industry must therefore demonstrate that new projects can be delivered predictably, making use of standardized designs, experienced project teams and repeat construction wherever possible.
10. Why is World Nuclear Symposium the right place to launch the World Nuclear Outlook Report 2026?
World Nuclear Symposium is the leading event bringing together the global nuclear industry, governments, technology providers, utilities, fuel-cycle companies, investors and other organizations involved in delivering nuclear projects.
Governments can establish objectives and create the policy environment for nuclear development, but it is the industry that must design, construct, fuel, maintain and operate the reactors those governments want to see delivered.
Launching the report at Symposium places its findings directly before the organizations responsible for turning ambition into action. It provides an opportunity to test the report’s conclusions, identify the barriers that still need to be addressed and encourage cooperation across the international nuclear community.
The World Nuclear Outlook Report describes the scale of the opportunity and the actions required to realize it. World Nuclear Symposium brings together the people and organizations capable of delivering that future.
Meet Dr Jonathan Cobb at World Nuclear Symposium
You can watch Jonathan’s session ‘Deep Dive into the newly published World Nuclear Outlook Report' on Thursday 10 September at the Knowledge Zone at 11.30 at World Nuclear Symposium.
And if you aren’t at Symposium, you can watch this session live on YouTube. Click ‘notify me’ to make sure you don’t miss it.