Assessment of readiness and progress towards national targets for nuclear capacity

Nuclear energy’s contribution to climate change mitigation was formally recognized in the Global Stocktake document unanimously agreed at the COP28 climate change meeting held in 2023.

Nuclear’s contribution to enhancing energy security and strengthening the resilience of energy supply has also become increasingly recognized during the energy crises that have occurred in the 2020s.

The significant policy support and ambition for an increase in global nuclear energy development and production means that, if met, governments’ individual goals for future nuclear deployment would collectively lead to more than a tripling of global nuclear capacity by 2050, compared to 2020 levels.

The WNOR assessment framework evaluates countries’ progress towards their stated goals and their readiness to implement and deliver new-build programmes. Countries are at various stages of development; many start from very different positions, with different infrastructure development and degrees of nuclear ambition. Some have active long-term new build programmes with reactor construction industries capable of delivering several units simultaneously; others have mature nuclear institutions and infrastructure but little or no active new-build programmes; and a growing number are considering nuclear power for the first time.

Methodology of country assessments

Countries have been assessed against four criteria. The first three – Policy Framework Readiness; Institutional & Infrastructure Readiness; and Project & Programme Readiness – assess the readiness of countries to deliver new nuclear capacity. The fourth criterion – Target Achievability – assesses the likelihood that a country will be able to achieve the targets for future nuclear capacity set by their government.

Policy Framework Readiness considers whether there is sustained political commitment to nuclear energy and whether that commitment has been translated into a clear policy framework. This includes national capacity or generation objectives, nuclear roadmaps, integration with wider energy and climate policy, arrangements for financing and revenue support, and the degree to which government policy provides a stable basis for long-term investment.

Institutional & Infrastructure Readiness assesses whether the organizations and wider infrastructure required to support a nuclear programme are in place and capable of operating at the scale envisaged. This includes regulatory capability and independence, legislation and nuclear liability arrangements, implementing organizations, workforce and skills, supply chain capability, fuel cycle arrangements, waste and spent fuel management, decommissioning and other supporting nuclear infrastructure.

Project & Programme Readiness assesses the extent to which policy has been converted into identifiable and deliverable reactor projects. Indicators include site selection and site investigation, technology selection, vendor and EPC arrangements, licensing and environmental approvals, ownership and project management structures, financing and final investment decisions, long-lead procurement, site preparation and progress towards or beyond first nuclear concrete. The assessment considers not only the maturity of individual projects but whether there is a credible programme capable of delivering successive projects where national objectives require multiple reactors.

Target Achievability provides an overall assessment of the credibility of meeting the stated national nuclear objective. It considers the scale of the gap between existing and targeted capacity, the maturity and timing of the project pipeline, historical and current delivery performance, construction rates required, financing and industrial constraints, and whether sufficient projects have been identified to support the target. A country may therefore score strongly on the first three criteria but receive a lower rating here if its target requires a substantially greater rate of deployment than its current programme is capable of delivering. A low score might only be a reflection of a highly ambitious target and not a reflection of a country’s readiness to engage in a new build programme.

Each country was individually assessed against these four criteria, and the results of these assessments are presented in this report. However, this section analyses the collective results of different groupings of countries that are at similar stages of nuclear deployment, termed Pacesetters, Expanders, Restarters, Newcomers and Candidates. These different groupings are described and assessed in the next section.

Additionally, countries that currently have operable reactors that could potentially still be in operation in 2050, but which have no plans or targets for new nuclear construction are termed Maintainers. As these countries have no intention to start new nuclear build they are not included in this assessment, although their potential contribution to global nuclear capacity in 2050 is covered elsewhere in this report.

Pacesetters: countries with active serial-build programmes

Pacesetters: China, Russia, South Korea

Pacesetter countries have had long-term programmes of nuclear build in the past and are broadly expected to continue those programmes into the future. Nuclear development is usually supported by ongoing supportive policy, established institutions experienced in new construction proposals and ongoing licensing, construction and commissioning of new reactors.

Regulators, utilities, vendors and construction organizations can apply experience from one project to subsequent units. A continuing order book gives supply chains an incentive to retain skilled workers and invest in manufacturing. Project organizations can also retain expertise instead of rebuilding teams after long gaps in construction.

All Pacesetter countries have shown the value of fleet build of standardized designs, robust supply chains and experienced workforces, which has helped deliver more predictable project delivery schedules and control costs. Future expansion in these countries is more credible because an operating delivery system already exists.

Strong policy support has enabled the established long-term build programmes in these countries. The weakening of political support in South Korea earlier this decade created uncertainty and led to delays in its new build programme. Ongoing strong policy support will be necessary to enable these countries to continue to meet their nuclear capacity objectives.

For these countries, the priority is to maintain continuity of expertise and institutional capacity. Stable forward programmes give utilities and suppliers greater confidence to retain skilled workforces and invest in manufacturing.

Expanders: countries with active programmes

Expanders: Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, India, Iran, Pakistan, Slovakia, United Kingdom, United States

Expander countries have active or recent nuclear build, but have not maintained ongoing programmes of build over the longer term.

With ongoing operation of existing reactors and recent new build activity, Policy Framework Readiness and Institutional & Infrastructure Readiness to support licensing, construction and commissioning are often present, although not necessarily at the scale required for the targeted expansion of new-build programmes.

For these countries, the priority is to build on the momentum of the recent construction projects to achieve the benefits of serial build. If this can be achieved, Expander countries will transition to Pacesetter country status.

In North America, the United States and Canada have long-established nuclear industries, large operating fleets and significant technical capabilities. Both envisage a larger future role for nuclear, are supporting SMRs and advanced reactors, and remain committed to new large reactors. Extending existing fleet operating lifetimes can also make a significant contribution to their capacity goals.

Countries can be categorized as Expander countries even if they have had a long history of new nuclear build, if the scale of that new build is significantly smaller than what would be required to meet government goals, or if much larger new-build programmes are targeted. India is one such country. It has maintained an ongoing build programme, but after nearly six decades of power reactor operation its current 8 GWe of nuclear capacity remains relatively low, supplying just 3% of the country’s electricity. Meeting the government’s objective of 100 GWe by 2047 will require a substantial increase in construction. The key question is not whether India can construct and operate nuclear plants – it clearly can – but whether reactor deployment, financing and industrial production can scale fast enough to support the much larger programme envisaged.

France retains a large nuclear utility, domestic industrial capability and extensive regulatory experience. Its future capacity will depend on two related processes: the degree to which long-term operation is implemented for the existing fleet and the scale of the EPR2 programme.

In the United Kingdom, construction at Hinkley Point C is expected to be followed by Sizewell C and the initial SMR construction at Wylfa. Delivering the UK’s longer-term ambition will depend on these projects being part of an ongoing sequence rather than isolated investments.

Expander countries typically benefit from good existing institutional and infrastructure capacity, including for licensing and permitting. However, lack of ongoing new-build programmes has often meant that construction projects have been affected by first-of-a-kind issues such as significant project overruns and cost increases, such as those encountered at Hinkley Point C, Flamanville 3 and Vogtle 3&4.

To overcome these issues, Expander countries need to recognize the importance of an ongoing nuclear programme that can deliver the cost benefits of series build of standardized designs. An expanded nuclear build programme will require a framework that will allocate finance risk appropriately between public and private sectors. The accelerated pace of construction will require regulatory optimization to ensure there is sufficient capacity to accelerate licensing and permitting. An accelerated new-build programme will also require sufficient supply chain capacity and skills development.

Restarters: countries with operating nuclear plants that are rebuilding construction capability

Restarters: Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Japan, Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Ukraine

Restarter countries have substantial operating fleets and mature nuclear institutions but limited recent experience of continuous new construction.

Institutional & Infrastructure Readiness is often comparatively strong in these countries. They typically have experienced regulators, operating utilities, established nuclear legislation, nuclear sites, research organizations and arrangements for waste management and emergency preparedness. Many also retain substantial engineering and industrial capability. However, the focus of these institutions will be on the continued operation of existing plants, not the requirements of a new-build programme. For example, regulators may not be suitably equipped to assess new reactor designs.

These countries need to scale this institutional base to support the larger project pipelines required by their renewed national ambitions.

Much of the near-term contribution to capacity is likely to come from the existing fleet through operating lifetime extensions, refurbishment, uprates and potentially reactor restarts. New construction is progressing, but meeting longer-term ambitions will require a substantial increase in project throughput.

A similar pattern appears in West & Central Europe. Political support for nuclear power has strengthened in several countries, and some previous phase-out policies have been reversed or substantially modified. Governments are also increasingly considering direct involvement in financing or revenue-support arrangements. This creates a more supportive investment environment, but moving from strengthened policy support to repeated construction takes time.

Sweden and Belgium show how quickly policy can shift in favour of additional nuclear generation. The next step is to convert that policy support into durable project structures by identifying owners, sites, financing mechanisms for investment decisions.

Existing nuclear capability lowers many barriers, but constructing one reactor periodically requires different capabilities from managing several projects simultaneously. Regulators and project organizations may need to expand, while manufacturing facilities may require investment to support higher throughput.

Across this group, the priority is to move from project-specific solutions to programme-level arrangements. A financing mechanism created for one reactor may enable that project to proceed, but a national target requiring several projects needs a reusable framework. The same applies to licensing, supply-chain development and workforce planning.

Several countries in this group are considering large reactors, SMRs, advanced reactors, reactor restarts and operating lifetime extensions concomitantly. All can contribute to overall capacity goals, but pursuing multiple streams will require greater regulatory and industrial capacity.

SMRs could become an important route to renewed deployment. These countries have extensive nuclear infrastructure, technical capability and potential markets that favour deployment. The key transition will come when demonstration and first commercial projects lead to repeat orders. A stable order book will be important for long-term deployment.

The outlook for Restarters is positive. Much of the institutional infrastructure already exists. The principal opportunity is to convert existing capability and renewed policy support into continuous construction. If they do so, these countries could provide substantial additional capacity by 2050.

Newcomers: countries with a first nuclear project under construction or advanced development

Newcomers: Bangladesh, Belarus, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Poland, Türkiye, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan

Newcomer countries either have their first reactor under construction, have reached an advanced stage of preparation, with construction expected in the near term, or have completed their first plant construction within the last ten years.

A country’s first project is a critical transition point. It converts general policy commitments into decisions on ownership, technology, site development, financing, licensing and workforce preparation.

Türkiye and Bangladesh are well established in this category, with their first units expected to start-up in the next 12 months. Their first plants provide practical experience in developing and regulating multi-unit sites. Future projects at other sites can build on that experience.

Subsequent projects may involve different vendors, financing arrangements and technology partnerships. A priority should therefore be to ensure that experience from the first programme strengthens domestic institutions and transfers to later projects.

Poland has moved well beyond general consideration of nuclear power, with its first construction programme expected to begin in the next year or two.

The country has identified sites and technologies for its principal large-reactor programme and undertaken significant institutional preparation. A wider range of potential large-reactor and SMR projects have also been proposed by different organizations.

Kazakhstan is well advanced in its plans for its first reactor construction at Balkhash; Russia and Kazakhstan have signed an international construction agreement and export loan agreement.

For Newcomers with a defined first project, the main recommendation is to use that project as a platform for the programme that follows. Workforce development, regulatory learning, supply-chain participation and project-management capability should all be designed with future units in mind. If follow-on decisions wait until construction ends, much of the newly-developed workforce and supply chain may disperse. A staged programme, with future decisions prepared alongside the first project will help ensure that a transition into a larger fleet deployment can incorporate lessons-learned from the first project.

Candidates: countries actively planning nuclear build

Candidates: Ecuador, Estonia, Ghana, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, Nigeria, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uganda, Vietnam

Candidate countries have decided that nuclear should form part of their future energy mix, distinguishing themselves from countries where nuclear is being evaluated as a future option.

For most of these countries this will first be established through a clear policy position. Beyond this milestone countries will establish programmes, begin site studies, develop regulatory institutions and enter discussions with potential vendors.

Southeast Asia contains a significant concentration of potential new entrants. Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Thailand are all advancing with nuclear energy playing a future role, although their programmes are at different stages.

Several have large and rapidly growing economies, substantial engineering and manufacturing sectors, experience with major infrastructure projects and broad technical expertise. Electricity demand is expected to rise substantially, while energy security, over-reliance on fossil fuel imports and decarbonization strengthen the case for nuclear energy.

Southeast Asian programmes therefore have significant long-term potential if political interest is converted into stable programme structures.

These countries should progress through institutional and project-development stages in ways that reflect their electricity systems. Reactor technology is only one part of the decision. Grid requirements, financing, domestic industrial participation, regulatory development, public engagement and ownership models will also determine appropriate technologies and project sizes.

For SMRs, smaller units may suit some electricity systems and allow programmes to grow incrementally, while others intend to pursue larger reactors. The regulatory, site, financing and workforce foundations required for nuclear power will remain valuable whichever technology is selected.

Regional cooperation would assist in the development of nuclear energy in Southeast Asia, and for other regions, such as Africa, Central Asia and Latin America. Regional cooperation can support programme development, cooperation on workforce training, regulatory knowledge, emergency planning, supply-chain qualification and technical education to help national programmes draw on a wider regional skills base.

High upfront capital costs are a challenge for nuclear projects everywhere, but in some Candidate countries the challenge is broader than financing a power plant alone. Such countries are simultaneously investing in electricity generation, transmission grids, distribution infrastructure, industrial development, transportation and other national priorities, all while facing constraints related to sovereign credit ratings and access to affordable long-term capital. This means that nuclear financing must be considered as part of a wider economic development and infrastructure strategy, rather than as a standalone energy project.

Nuclear can be a powerful part of that broader development agenda, but success will require innovative partnerships, patient capital and sustained international cooperation. Nuclear milestones should be linked to wider electricity-sector milestones. Site development, regulator capability, grid reinforcement and financing readiness can provide intermediate measures of progress before construction begins.

Where long-term nuclear requirements could be large, but programme capability is still developing, a manageable initial project can provide a stronger foundation than defining an entire multi-gigawatt fleet at the outset. This can establish the institutions and experience needed for later expansion.

In those countries in Africa and Central Asia that have significant uranium reserves and resources, linking uranium resources with the deployment of nuclear energy itself, creating the reliable, low-carbon power needed to support sustainable mining, manufacturing and other energy-intensive industries may present significant opportunities.

Assessment in the context of the capacity contribution

Figures 1-5 in the above assessment of the country groupings present the analysis with equal weighting for each country. However, the potential contribution made by countries to meeting the global tripling will be determined by the capacity each category contributes.

Figures 6-9 shows a capacity-weighted interpretation of the WNOR assessments. Note that the capacity-weighted assessments include reactor capacity in the categories: Under Construction, Planned, Proposed and Potential, as well as the additional capacity required to meet national targets. It does not include capacity associated with the continued operation of existing reactors.

The largest quantity of prospective nuclear capacity is associated with the Expander countries, with a total capacity of around 530 GWe, followed by Pacesetter countries, with a total capacity of just over 300 GWe.

While the Pacesetter countries are rated quite highly against all four criteria, Expanders are rated almost equally highly for Policy Framework Readiness and Institutional & Infrastructure Readiness, but much of the Expander capacity is not yet matched by equally strong rankings against the Project & Programme Readiness or Target Achievability criteria.

This shows that in many of the countries representing the largest prospective capacity, policy commitment is already comparatively strong, however the challenge will be to translate that commitment into specific, financed, licensed and repeatable projects at the pace required by national targets.

The ratings of the Restarters become progressively weaker from Policy Framework Readiness and Institutional & Infrastructure Readiness through to Project & Programme Readiness and Target Achievability. This is consistent with countries that retain nuclear knowledge and institutions but have not recently sustained serial construction programmes. For this group, the focus needs to be on rebuilding project pipelines, supply-chain capability, financing arrangements and experienced delivery organizations.

For Newcomers, the rankings for Policy Framework Readiness, Institutional & Infrastructure Readiness and Project & Programme Readiness are relatively high, but Target Achievability is ranked weaker.

The capacity contribution of Candidate countries is around 100 GWe. There is a great deal of variation in the rankings given to different countries, although rankings for Project & Programme Readiness and Target Achievability are lower overall. Much of the capacity in this category remains at an earlier stage where the decisions and institutions necessary for credible deployment have yet to be completed.

Common findings from country readiness assessments

The WNOR country assessments show that prospects for achieving national nuclear objectives – and collectively progressing towards tripling global nuclear capacity by 2050 – depend on many factors. For some countries there is high confidence they will be able to meet their targets, while others will require significant action to make sufficient progress.

Countries will follow different pathways, depending on their individual circumstances. The assessments cover programmes operating under very different political systems, electricity markets, industrial structures and financing models. For established nuclear countries and new entrants alike, targets can provide policy direction, but they become more credible when supported by institutions, financing frameworks, building supply chains, skilled workforces and identifiable projects.

There are also recognizable geographical patterns. In North America, the United States and Canada both combine substantial nuclear industries with renewed ambitions for expansion and considerable innovation in new nuclear technologies, such as a wider range of SMR designs. They are assessed to have recently transitioned from Restarter to Expander.

In Southeast Asia, several countries are currently Candidates but may soon transition to Newcomer status. Many have rapidly growing economies, sophisticated industrial sectors and broad technical capabilities that provide a solid foundation for nuclear development.

Several European countries are classified as Restarter countries – mature nuclear institutions and increasing political support, but a need to rebuild the supply chains and project-delivery capabilities required for sustained new construction.

The country readiness assessments identify a series of programme archetypes rather than a simple division between countries that are ‘ready’ and those that are not. Each has different strengths and would benefit from different actions to improve delivery of national objectives.

Implications for the global tripling objective

The global challenge is not evenly distributed among dozens of countries. A very large share of the capacity that would contribute to expansion is concentrated in a relatively small number of Expanders and Pacesetters. Consequently, the global outcome will depend disproportionately on whether Pacesetters can maintain high build rates, while Expanders convert large policy ambitions into committed project pipelines and sustained construction programmes.

Newcomers and Candidates will contribute to broadening nuclear deployment geographically and creating growth beyond the existing nuclear markets, but in absolute capacity terms they cannot compensate by themselves for major under-delivery among the large Expander programmes.

Interpreting country capacity target assessments

The low rankings of some Expander countries for achieving their national capacity target goals does not necessarily mean that those countries will not have a significant quantity of additional nuclear capacity by 2050. Countries such as the USA and India have very high 2050 capacity goals, which are currently assessed as unlikely to be met. At the same time, they are expected to make significant contributions to achieving the global tripling target.

Opportunities to strengthen delivery

Across the WNOR country assessments, several recommendations apply to countries at different stages of nuclear development.

First, long-term targets should be translated into near to intermediate-term programme milestones, such as site selection, financing decisions, licensing applications, first concrete, commissioning of initial projects and subsequent orders.

These milestones allow progress towards the tripling objective to be measured through observable programme development well before the target year.

Second, programme continuity matters across almost every category. Serial builders need it to preserve their advantage. Mature nuclear countries need it to rebuild construction capability. Intermittent builders need it to increase deployment rates. New entrants need it to retain expertise and capabilities developed for their first project.

A programme of several units built in a reasonably continuous sequence may be easier to sustain industrially than the same number of reactors delivered as unrelated projects over several decades.

Third, institutional capacity must match the scale of the objective. The question is not simply whether a country has a regulator, an owner-operator or an engineering supply chain, but whether those organizations can realistically support the number and variety of projects envisaged.

For established nuclear countries, this may mean expanding existing organizations. For newcomers, it may mean ensuring that institutions created for the first project can develop into permanent national organizations. In both cases, workforce planning will become increasingly important as more countries expand nuclear programmes simultaneously.

Fourth, financing should be treated as a programme capability, not only a project requirement. Financing must be designed into a nuclear project from its inception, rather than treated as an afterthought. The objective should be to move beyond bespoke financing for individual plants and establish standardised, repeatable frameworks that enable nuclear projects to access mainstream infrastructure finance at scale. Standardisation, fleet deployment and successful repetition should reduce perceived risk, transaction costs and the cost of capital.

Fifth, technology strategy and programme strategy must be considered together. Large reactors, SMRs and advanced reactors may all have roles, but each additional technology adds demands on regulators, utilities and supply chains. Countries with sufficient scale may sustain several technology streams; others may benefit from greater standardization, particularly during early programme development.

This is particularly relevant to countries considering SMRs as a significant part of future capacity. SMRs may offer advantages where smaller unit size, incremental deployment or industrial applications matter. Their contribution will become more credible as first projects enter construction and lead to repeat orders. Countries can prepare by developing technology-neutral elements of nuclear readiness – sites, regulation, workforce, financing frameworks and grid planning – without determining every aspect of the eventual reactor fleet.

Finally, maintaining existing nuclear capacity is important alongside developing new projects. In countries with mature fleets, operating lifetime extension can make a major contribution to capacity available in 2050. Continued operation also preserves skills, operating organizations, sites and supply chains that can support future construction.

Progress towards tripling nuclear capacity

Established nuclear countries are reconsidering expansion, several governments have reversed earlier restrictions on new nuclear development, and a growing number of new entrants are incorporating nuclear power into long-term energy strategies.

This broadening of interest matters because tripling global capacity is unlikely to depend on one region or one reactor technology. Different groups of countries are also likely to contribute at different stages.

Active serial builders are best placed to add significant capacity in the near and medium term because they already have functioning delivery systems. Mature nuclear countries could contribute increasingly as financing arrangements, supply chains and project pipelines develop. New entrants can add further capacity during the 2030s and 2040s, while emerging programmes represent an important source of longer-term growth.

For serial-build countries, the priority is to maintain continuity, standardization and an investable project pipeline. Mature nuclear countries need to convert renewed policy support and strong institutions into repeatable financing and construction programmes. New entrants need to move from policy commitment through institutional development to a well-defined first project, while using that project to build capabilities for subsequent deployment.