Executive Summary

Global nuclear capacity would expand significantly to 2050 if the continued operation of existing reactors and the deployment of new nuclear build meet targets set by governments for national nuclear capacity. When all operable, under construction, planned, proposed, and potential (note a) reactors are combined with government targets, the total global capacity could reach 1446 GWe^b by 2050, surpassing the approximately 1200 GWe target established under the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy, which was launched at the COP28 meeting in Dubai in 2023. This indicates strong international support for nuclear energy as a core component of climate and energy security strategies.

Key Findings

1. Global nuclear capacity outlook

• Total capacity in 2050 could reach 1446 GWe by 2050, surpassing the approximately 1200 GWe target established under the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy.
• Most growth to 2030 stems from reactors currently under construction; planned projects drive expansion to 2035; and proposed, potential, and government-driven programmes account for the increase in capacity after 2035.
• Five countries — China, France, India, Russia, and the USA — would represent nearly 980 GWe of total global nuclear capacity in 2050.
• Newcomer nuclear nations have ambitions for nuclear capacity to reach 157 GWe by 2050, highlighting rising interest beyond traditional nuclear operators.

2. Reactor long-term operation could contribute more than one-quarter of 2050 capacity

• Of the global reactor fleet operable in 2025, 189 GWe would have operated for up to 60 years by 2050; up to an additional 213 GWe could continue to operate if operating lifetimes were extended up to 80 years. 
• Historical performance data show no age-related decline in reactor capacity factors, and the average age of  permanently shut-down reactors has increased, reaching 48 years in 2024, with no indication of an upper limit on the duration of reactor operation.
• Operating lifetime extension remains one of the most cost-effective ways t secure additional low-carbon electricity.

3. Build rates would need to increase significantly

• Achieving the projected 2050 capacity requires scaling annual grid connections from 14.4 GWe/yr (2026–2030), 22.3 GWe/yr (2031-2035), 49.2 GWe/yr (2036–2040), 51.6 GWe/yr (2041-2045) and 65.3 GWe/yr (2046-2050).
• The required 65.3 GWe/yr during 2046–2050 is roughly double the historic peak build rate seen in the 1980s.

4. Government targets are ambitious but not fully backed by plans

• The 542 GWe of additional capacity associated with government targets beyond projects assessed as planned, proposed or potential is not yet supported by identified projects, and the level of commitment through policy or other governmental measures varies significantly from country to country.
• Several national targets (e.g., the USA’s 400 GWe by 2050) rely heavily on an expansion of nuclear capacity where there is currently little or no ongoing construction, or identified reactors planned or proposed for deployment.
• Targets are predominately aspirational, and not all planned or proposed reactors will inevitably proceed to construction.

5. Energy demand trends reinforce the need for nuclear expansion

Five major global trends will significantly influence electricity and energy demand by 2050:

• Expanding supply to the 750 million people who lack access to electricity.
• Meeting, in an equitable manner, the energy needs of the rising global population, projected to reach 9.8 billion by 2050.
• Accelerating electrification, in all sectors of the economy, as countries shift from fossil fuels to low-carbon electricity.
• Growing consumption from new technologies, including digital infrastructure and data-intensive processes.
• Decarbonising hard to abate sectors of the economy through alternative sources of low-carbon heat.

Recommendations for governments, industry, and stakeholders

For governments

• Recognize that nuclear energy is a central pillar in meeting global climate goals, especially given the expected increase in electricity and energy demand.
• Integrate nuclear energy into long-term decarbonization and energy security planning, alongside renewables and other low-carbon technologies.
• Set durable, actionable nuclear policies and industrial strategies to enable long-term investment and to maintain industrial capabilities, workforce and supply chains.
• Support operating lifetime extension programmes to 60-80 years where technically feasible, avoiding premature closures.
• Reform electricity markets to ensure equitable treatment of nuclear energy alongside other low-carbon sources.
• Support the acceleration of licensing, siting, and financing mechanisms to facilitate an increase in construction rates.

For financial institutions

• Implement technology-neutral lending and ESG policies to ensure nuclear and other low-carbon sources are evaluated using equivalent criteria.
• Support nuclear deployment in emerging economies through financing frameworks, guarantees, and multilateral partnerships.

For the nuclear industry

• Expand manufacturing and supply chain capacity, including fuel cycle infrastructure.
• Optimize series build to reduce costs and shorten build times.
• Develop large-scale deployment strategies to meet post-2035 demand, including for non-grid applications utilizing novel reactor technologies.

Conclusion

National nuclear capacity goals to 2050 exceed the global tripling target and reflect strong alignment between national objectives and global decarbonization needs. Achieving these ambitions will require unprecedented construction rates, strategic lifetime extension of existing reactors, and significant policy and market reforms. If nations deliver on their commitments, nuclear power would play a critical role in ensuring secure, affordable, and net-zero-compatible energy for a rapidly expanding and electrified global economy.