Iran - World Nuclear Outlook Report
Current operations
Iran has one Russian VVER-1000 unit in operation at the Bushehr plant. Russia’s Rosatom is building a second VVER-1000 at Bushehr and excavation works on a third unit commenced in January 2021.
In September 2024 the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) said that Bushehr 2 would start up in 2029. First concrete for unit 3 was planned to be poured before the end of 2024, although this has not been confirmed to have taken place. Construction at the site was disrupted by the 2026 conflict in the Middle East, although it has been reported that construction work on units 2&3 has recommenced.
Table Ir.1 Nuclear capacity status (as of 1 October 2026)
| Operable reactors | Operable reactors net capacity (MWe) | Operable reactors gross capacity (MWe) | Reactors under construction | Reactors under construction gross capacity (MWe) | Carbon dioxide emissions avoided (cf. coal) (MtCO2) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 915 | 1000 | 1 | 1057 | 65.5 |
Nuclear policy and outlook
Iran has set a target of 20 GWe of nuclear capacity by 2041.
The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) announced a plan in 2007 to build a 360 MWe light water reactor designed by Iran at Darkhovin. The IR-360 design was completed in 2012 and groundworks commenced in 2022. The AEOI estimated that the project would be finished by 2030. In July 2026 the IAEA reported it was investigating reports that the site had been attacked as part of the ongoing conflict, while noting that construction was at a very early stage. Its capacity not included in this assessment.
In addition to the new build projects at Bushehr and Darkhovin, work at a new site near the cities of Minab and Sirik in the southern coastal province of Hormozgan commenced in February 2024, according to the AEOI. In September 2025, the Iran Hormoz Company and Rosatom signed a $25 billion executive agreement to build four third-generation nuclear power units at the Iran-Hormoz plant. Each of the four units would have a capacity of 1255 MWe.
Table Ir.2 Contributions to total capacity projection in 2050 (gross)
| 60 year operation (MWe) | 80 year operation (MWe) | Currently under construction capacity (MWe) | Planned capacity (MWe) | Proposed capacity (MWe) | Potential capacity (MWe) | Government capacity target (MWe) | Additional capacity* required to meet government target (MWe) | Total capacity (MWe) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1000 | - | 1057 | 1057 | 5020 | - | 20,000 | 11,866 | 20,000 |
| *Capacity additional to operable, under construction, planned, proposed and potential capacities required to meet the government target. | ||||||||
Readiness Assessment
Iran has institutional and technical foundations and at least one substantive reactor construction project. However, the scale and timing of the 20 GWe target are not supported by the present project pipeline. Most of the additional capacity needed to meet the target remains insufficiently defined.
| Country Category | Expander |
|---|---|
| Policy Framework Readiness | Moderate Sustained state commitment and a 20 GWe ambition, but limited evidence of a funded, sequenced delivery plan for that scale. |
| Institutional & Infrastructure Readiness | Moderate Iran has operating, regulatory, engineering and nuclear fuel cycle institutions, but international safety convention coverage, safeguards cooperation, access to international expertise and regulatory transparency remain important weaknesses. |
| Programme & Project Development Readiness | Low-Moderate Bushehr 2 is under construction; Bushehr 3 is in preparation and Darkhovin is at an early stage of development. However, most of the 20 GWe objective has not reached mature project status and current projects face significant geopolitical and financing risks. |
| Target Achievability | Low Reaching 20 GWe by 2041-42 would require approximately 19 GWe of additions in around 15 years, while only about 1.1 GWe is formally under construction. A substantial expansion is credible, but delivery of the full target by the stated date is unlikely. |