Ukraine - World Nuclear Outlook Report
Current operations
Ukraine has 15 operable reactors at four plants, Rivne, Khmelnitski, South Ukraine and Zaporizhzhia. All are VVER types: two upgraded 440 MWe V-312 units and 13 of the larger VVER-1000.
The six units at Zaporizhzhia have been under Russian military control since March 2022, have generated no electricity since September 2022 and have been in cold shutdown since April 2024. The other nine reactors remain under Ukrainian control. Despite the shutdown at Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine’s other nuclear plants continue to provide around half of its electricity supply.
The original design life for Ukraine's reactors was 30 years. The regulator, SNRIU, extended Rivne 1 and 2 to December 2030 and December 2031 and Rivne 3 by 20 years in July 2018. Energoatom also plans 20-year extensions for the 11 oldest 1000 MWe reactors.
Construction of Khmelnitski 3 and 4 began in 1986 and 1987 but has been suspended since 1990, with unit 3 reportedly around 80% complete and unit 4 about 25%. In February 2025 Ukraine’s parliament approved the purchase of equipment from Bulgaria’s cancelled Belene project to complete them, and the president signed the law in March, but Bulgaria reversed its decision in April 2025.
Ukraine has ended all use of Russian nuclear fuel, with uranium hexafluoride now supplied by Cameco and fuel manufactured by Westinghouse Electric Sweden.
Table Ua.1 Nuclear capacity status (as of 1 October 2026)
| Operable reactors | Operable reactors net capacity (MWe) | Operable reactor gross capacity (MWe) | Reactors under construction | Reactors under construction gross capacity (MWe) | Cumulative carbon dioxide emissions avoided 1970-2025 (c.f. coal) (MtCO2) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 15 | 13,107 | 13,835 |
2 |
2178 | 2832 |
Nuclear policy and outlook
In April 2026, First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Energy Denys Shmyhal stated Ukraine’s ambition was to reach 25 GWe of nominal nuclear generating capacity by 2050.
In June 2022 Energoatom and Westinghouse signed an agreement to construct nine AP1000 units, adding 11,250 MWe. These could include two units at Khmelnitski, one or more at Chyhyryn and two at South Ukraine. Equipment for Khmelnitski 5 was contracted in December 2023, and in August 2024 Energoatom said land had been transferred to it for a possible four-unit plant at Chyhyryn.
Ukraine has also signed agreements with Holtec, NuScale and Westinghouse regarding potential deployment of SMRs.
Table Ua.2 Contributions to total capacity projection in 2050 (gross)
| 60 year operation (MWe) | 80 year operation (MWe) | Currently under construction capacity (MWe) | Planned capacity (MWe) | Proposed capacity (MWe) | Potential capacity (MWe) | Government capacity target (MWe) | Additional capacity* required to meet government target (MWe) | Total capacity (MWe) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3000 | 10,835 | 2178 | 2500 | 8750 | - | 25,000 | 0 | 27,263 |
| *Capacity additional to operable, under construction, planned, proposed and potential capacities required to meet the government target. | ||||||||
Readiness Assessment
Ukraine has deep nuclear capability and a defined pathway to 25 GWe, but the war, the occupation of Zaporizhzhia and Bulgaria’s reversal on the Belene equipment leave new build at a pre-investment stage.
| Country Category | Newcomer |
|---|---|
| Policy Framework Readiness | Moderate Nuclear remains central to the 2050 energy strategy. A 25 GWe objective, Khmelnitski 3-6 and the nine-AP1000 partnership give a defined pathway, and fuel-cycle localisation is progressing. War and incomplete project legislation affect execution. |
| Institutional and Infrastructure Readiness | High Experienced operator and regulator, VVER expertise, extensive nuclear engineering capability, Westinghouse fuel experience, domestic uranium resources and operational central spent-fuel storage. |
| Programme & Project Development | Moderate Substantial engineering and environmental work is under way, but Khmelnitski 3-4 construction remains suspended, and the AP1000 programme is pre-FID. |
| Target Achievability | Moderate Reaching 25 GWe requires recovery or replacement of Zaporizhzhia capacity, completion of Khmelnitski 3-4 and a large AP1000 fleet. The war, financing needs and project maturity make the strategic timeframe highly uncertain.. |
