World Nuclear Outlook Report 2026 Full Document

1 Executive Summary

Nuclear energy entered 2026 with renewed growth and stronger policy support. Global nuclear generation reached a record 2702 TWh in 2025, 35 TWh higher than in 2024, and supplied around 9% of world electricity. Growth was led by Asia, while generation remained broadly stable in the Americas and Africa and declined in Western and Central Europe following reactor closures.

The existing fleet continues to perform strongly. The average capacity factor rose to 83.7%, with no general deterioration among reactors operating for more than 40 years. This reinforces the value of long-term operation as an immediate and cost-effective source of low-carbon electricity. Since 1970, nuclear generation is estimated to have avoided 43.6 billion tonnes of CO₂ compared with gas and 97.2 billion tonnes compared with coal.

Construction is increasing, but remains below the level required. Eleven reactors started construction in 2025, nine in China and two in Russia. Three reactors were connected to the grid and seven permanently shut down. Tripling global capacity by 2050 would eventually require build rates around six times current levels.

1.1 The capacity ambition is sufficient for tripling

The central World Nuclear Outlook Report (WNOR) 2026 finding is that government ambitions remain collectively sufficient to triple global nuclear capacity by 2050. If national targets and identified projects are achieved and the existing fleet continues operating, capacity would reach 1457 GWe in 2050.

The project pipeline has strengthened. Since the previous edition, capacity under construction has risen from 76 to 82 GWe and planned capacity from 107 to 114 GWe, whereas proposed capacity has fallen from 294 to 289 GWe and potential capacity has fallen from 24 to 13 GWe, showing a shift to more certain and nearer-term categories.  Additional capacity required to meet government targets has increased from 542 to 559 GWe, with additional targets introduced by new governments.

Existing nuclear countries account for 1303 GWe of projected 2050 capacity, sufficient by themselves to meet the level associated with the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy. New entrant countries contribute a further 154 GWe.

1.2 Delivery capability will determine whether ambitions are achieved

WNOR assesses Policy Framework Readiness, Institutional & Infrastructure Readiness, Project & Programme Readiness, and the credibility of achieving National Government Targets. Targets are most credible where political commitment, institutions, financing and projects advance together.

The assessments identify five programme groupings:

1. Pacesetters maintain continuous construction programmes and established licensing, delivery and commissioning systems. Their priority is to preserve and expand this capability.
2. Expanders have active or recent new-build experience but need to increase deployment substantially and convert individual projects into repeat programmes.
3. Restarters have mature institutions and operating experience but limited recent continuous construction. They must adapt and scale existing capabilities for new build.
4. Newcomers have recently completed, are constructing or are advancing their first plant. They should retain the regulatory, workforce and supply-chain experience gained for subsequent projects.
5. Candidates have decided nuclear should play a future role but must convert political commitment into institutions, financing and deliverable projects.

1.3 Policy recommendations for tripling global nuclear capacity

The country assessments support coordinated action across the nuclear system:

1. Establish durable policy. Governments should integrate nuclear into long-term energy and industrial strategies and frameworks that recognize nuclear’s contribution to achieving policy goals.
2. Create a favourable investment environment. Investment in nuclear energy should be encouraged, recognizing it as a strategic national asset, mobilizing a full range of public, private and multilateral financial institutions to support nuclear deployment.
3. Improve regulatory efficiency. Licensing and regulatory frameworks should be optimized. Greater international cooperation and use of credible assessments from other jurisdictions can improve efficiency. Regulators need sufficient expertise and resources for existing reactors, new construction and emerging technologies.
4. Use existing assets fully. Lifetime extensions, uprates, improved performance, suitable restarts and timely completion of reactors under construction preserve both generating capacity and the wider nuclear ecosystem.
5. Deploy proven reactors while enabling SMRs and advanced technologies. Repeat deployment of proven designs offers the fastest route to scale, while R&D, licensing and demonstration support can bring newer technologies to commercial deployment.
6. Expand fuel supply ahead of demand. Uranium exploration and mining, conversion, enrichment, fabrication and specialized fuel capacity require early investment because of their long lead times.
7. Remove barriers if reprocessing is adopted. Governments with a policy of reprocessing should provide consistent long-term policy frameworks, with regulatory certainty to support closed fuel cycles.
8. Plan for waste management and decommissioning. Credible, funded strategies should cover storage, transport, recycling where adopted, disposal and decommissioning.
9. Strengthen the supply chain. Credible pipelines should support investment in manufacturing, construction, engineering and qualified suppliers, aided by greater alignment of codes and procurement requirements.
10. Move from projects to programmes. Standardized designs, clear delivery models, early supply-chain engagement and coordinated procurement can transfer learning and reduce risk.
11. Build the workforce early. Strategies should evaluate skills needs across regulation, construction, operation and the fuel cycle, supported by education, training, knowledge exchange, international mobility and reskilling from adjacent industries.
12. Build public confidence. Enable communities to participate in early, sustained and evidence-based engagement and build understanding of the energy, employment and regional benefits of projects.

1.4 From targets to sustained programmes

Country assessments repeatedly show that long-term targets need intermediate milestones; programme continuity retains expertise and enables learning; institutional and financing capacity must match programme scale; and technology choices should support standardisation. Maintaining the existing fleet also preserves the sites, skills and supply chains needed for expansion.

1.5 The priority is implementation

The outlook is positive but conditional. Ambitions are sufficient and the pipeline is maturing, but the rate of reactor deployment needs to increase substantially. Projects needed in the 2030s depend on financing, licensing, manufacturing and workforce decisions taken now; capacity for the 2040s depends on turning initial projects into repeat programmes.

Tripling remains achievable if governments and industry preserve the fleet, complete current construction, commit to new projects and build repeatable delivery, financing, regulatory, fuel-supply and workforce capabilities. The targets exist; the task now is to build the delivery system capable of achieving them.
 

2 Global performance highlights for 2025

2.1 Nuclear generation in different geographical regions

Nuclear reactors supplied a total of 2702 TWh of electricity in 2025, up 35 TWh from 2667 TWh in 2024, thereby setting a new annual record for global electricity supply.

Figure 2.1 shows the long-term development of global nuclear electricity generation. Nuclear energy was first used for electricity in the mid-1950s. It did not, however, make a significant contribution to global electricity supply until a period of rapid growth in the 1970s and 1980s. Growth then slowed through to 2006, followed by a five-year period in which global output fell, primarily because of lower generation in West & Central Europe. Generation then fell sharply in 2011 and 2012 following the accident at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi plant.

Since 2012, global nuclear output has again trended upwards, with particularly strong growth in Asia, where output rose by approximately two-and-a-half times between 2012 and 2025. This growth has been led by the rapid expansion of nuclear generation in China, alongside new reactor starts in India, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates.

Since 2012, nuclear generation in North America, South America and Africa has remained broadly stable, while East Europe & Russia has seen a gradual increase. West & Central Europe has continued to record declining generation, with Germany closing all its reactors and older reactors closing in Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.

2.2 The contribution of nuclear to electricity supply

Nuclear generation supplied 9% of the world’s electricity in 2025. Although generation in absolute terms is at an all-time high, nuclear’s share of the electricity mix has declined from around 17% in the mid-1990s, because overall electricity supply has grown faster than nuclear generation.

Figure 2.3 places nuclear generation in the context of overall electricity demand, illustrating that nuclear output is at a record high while its share of global electricity supply has declined from its mid-1990s peak, as shown in Figure 2.4

2.3 The contribution of nuclear to mitigating climate change

Since 1970, nuclear generation has avoided an estimated 43.6 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions relative to generating the same amount of electricity in gas-fired power plants. At current generation levels, nuclear avoids the emission of around 1.25 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide each year. This is more than the combined annual CO₂ emissions from the aviation and shipping sectors.

Compared with coal-fired power plants, which are more carbon-intensive, nuclear generation has avoided 97.2 billion tonnes of CO₂ emissions. This cumulative total is greater than emissions from the entire energy sector in 2025 (38.1 billion tonnes CO₂).

2.4 Composition of the global nuclear fleet

The current fleet of nuclear power reactors is dominated by large-capacity units. At the end of 2025, global net operable capacity was 400 GWe, up from 398 GWe in 2024.

The majority of electricity production comes from reactors that have been in service for between 30 and 50 years. However, the increase in the number of new reactor start-ups since 2015 is reflected in the rising proportion of electricity generation from reactors that have operated for less than a decade.

Most reactors in use today are pressurized water reactors (PWRs), which emerged as the predominant reactor type in the 1970s and have continued to increase in number. The next most common reactor types are boiling water reactors (BWRs) and pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs), although the number of reactors using these designs has declined in recent years.

The first generation of reactors built in the 1950s and 1960s were small compared with most reactors built later, with capacities below 500 MWe. Larger reactor designs were deployed during the 1970s and 1980s, offering the potential for greater economies of scale.

Although most reactors on which construction started in the past decade have capacities above 1 GWe, some smaller reactors continue to be built. Significant future deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs) would increase the number of new smaller-capacity reactors, but larger reactors are likely to continue to account for most capacity added to 2050.

2.5 Changes to the global nuclear fleet in 2025

Three reactors were connected to the grid in 2025, one each in China, Russia and India. Construction times differed significantly, from 62 months for Zhangzhou 2 in China to 163 months for Rajasthan 7 in India. The shorter construction period in China is consistent with the benefits of an active new-build programme based on standardised designs built in series.

Seven reactors shut down in 2025, including three units in Belgium and three small units at Bilibino in Russia. The Bilibino reactors had reached the end of operations, however, whereas the other four reactors were closed as a result of political decisions.

Eleven reactors started construction in 2025, matching the total in 2024. Nine of the new reactors to start construction were in China and two in Russia. Over the last 40 years, this number of new construction starts has been exceeded only in 2009 and 2010.

Meeting the target of tripling nuclear capacity by 2050 would require construction start rates to accelerate to around six times current levels by the mid-2030s.

Most reactors under construction today began construction within the last ten years. Among those that have been under construction for more than ten years, most have experienced periods of suspension. Only the PFBR prototype in India has had a continuous construction period longer than ten years.

2.6 Nuclear reactor capacity factors in 2025

In 2025, the global average capacity factor was 83.7%, up from 82.9% in 2024, continuing the trend of high-capacity factors recorded since 2000. Capacity factors in this section are based on the performance of reactors that reported electricity generation in the relevant calendar year.

Average capacity factors have increased steadily in each decade since the 1970s, with the greatest improvements taking place in the 1980s and 1990s. Capacity factors have continued to improve in subsequent decades, and the capacity factor deciles in 2025 were broadly similar to those in recent years.

2.7 The influence of length of operating life on age-related performance

There is no overall age-related decline in nuclear reactor performance as measured by the average capacity factors achieved by reactors of different ages. Figure 2.11 shows the average capacity factor for each reactor age over the six-year period from 2020 to 2025. The strong performance of reactors that have operated for more than 40 years demonstrates that reactor age does not, by itself, prevent strong performance during extended operation.

Extending the operating lifetimes of nuclear power plants is among the most cost-effective ways of securing additional low-carbon generation, according to the International Energy Agency.

In August 2026 the mean age of the world’s operable nuclear power reactors was 33 years. There were 46 operable reactors that commenced operation more than 50 years ago, representing around 10% of currently operable reactors.

The average age at which nuclear reactors have been permanently shut down has been steadily increasing over time. The average age of those reactors permanently shut down in 2025 was 48.7 years, up on the average of 47.3 years for 2024.

3 Global outlook for nuclear capacity goals

3.1 Projection of nuclear capacity in 2050

Global operable nuclear capacity is projected to reach 1457 GWe by 2050 if: i) reactors currently operable operate up to a maximum of 80 years, unless stated to have a shorter period of operation; ii) reactors classified as under construction, planned, or proposed as of 1 August 2026 enter operation by 2050; and iii) any additional capacity required to meet national nuclear capacity targets also enters operation.

Capacities in this forward-looking section refer to the gross capacity of a nuclear plant - the maximum electrical output generated by the nuclear plant’s generator, enabling easier comparisons between existing and future reactors. The Global Performance chapter reports the net capacity of operable reactors, the electrical output available for supply to the grid after subtracting the plant’s own electricity consumption.

There have been some small changes in the capacities in each of these categories since the  2025 projections used in the previous edition of the World Nuclear Outlook Report.

There are reductions in the capacities estimated for longer term and less committed categories (Proposed; Potential), and an increase in more certain, near-term capacity (Planned; Under construction).

This trajectory would be expected if plans and proposals for new reactors were advancing to meet government goals and the rate of new construction were accelerating. However, whether these are the reasons for the changes observed will only become clear if the trends are continued in future reports.

The 60-year operation capacity has fallen and the 80-year operation capacity has risen because these category definitions have changed. In the previous report, any reactor approved to operate for more than 60 years was included in the 80-year category. This year, only those reactors that will have operated for less than 60 years are included in the 60-year operation category, regardless of whether they have received approval to operate for longer.

3.2 Global capacity projections 2026-2050

The figure below shows projected global reactor capacity by category, based on the combined capacity trajectories for each country.

Of the 423 GWe (gross) of nuclear capacity currently in operation, 401 GWe is projected to remain in operation in 2050. This comprises 171 GWe from reactors that would have operated for less than 60 years and 230 GWe from reactors operating for between 60 and 80 years. The remaining 19 GWe largely reflects reactors expected to close before 2050 because of national policies, such as in Spain, or technical factors, such as the UK’s AGR reactors. It also includes a small number of reactors that would exceed 80 years of operation by 2050. These are assumed to have closed for the purposes of this report, although operation beyond 80 years cannot be ruled out.

Growth in nuclear capacity to 2030 is expected to come primarily from reactors currently under construction, adding 54 GWe by 2030. A further 28 GWe of capacity now under construction is expected to enter operation by 2035.

Planned reactors, defined as those usually expected to enter operation within 15 years, are projected to add 106 GWe by 2041 and a further 8 GWe by 2050.

Proposed reactors are projected to add 289 GWe by 2050, with more than half of this capacity entering operation between 2041 and 2050. A further 13 GWe is attributed to the Potential category. Beyond these identified projects, an additional 559 GWe would be required to meet stated government goals and targets.

3.3 Regional capacity projections

Of the projected total global nuclear capacity of 1457 GWe in 2050, 1303 GWe is in countries where nuclear reactors already operate. This capacity alone would be sufficient to meet the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy capacity goal, if the targets in these countries are met.

Five countries dominate the capacity: China, France, India, Russia and the USA, with a combined 986 GWe of nuclear capacity in 2050.

New entrant countries, including those with their first reactors under construction in 2025, are projected to reach a combined nuclear capacity of 154 GWe by 2050.

3.4 Analysis

The first edition of the World Nuclear Outlook Report concluded that national ambitions for future nuclear capacity, if delivered, would be sufficient to exceed the global goal of tripling nuclear capacity by 2050 from 2020 levels. This goal was first agreed at COP28 in Dubai in 2023 and has now been endorsed by 38 countries.

The second edition confirms this conclusion. Meeting current national goals would result in 1457 GWe of nuclear capacity operating in 2050, very close to the 1446 GWe projected in the first edition. Although less than a year has passed since the first report was published, there are some indications that nuclear development plans are becoming more concrete. Capacity associated with projects that are under construction or categorized as Planned has increased, while less certain and longer term Proposed and Potential capacity has decreased.

Nevertheless, more than 550 GWe of the capacity required to meet national goals is not yet associated with projects classified as under construction, planned or proposed. In addition, not every planned or proposed project can be assumed to result in an operating reactor, and some existing reactors may not continue to operate to 2050.

The next chapter therefore assesses how well-prepared countries are to deliver their stated ambitions and the extent to which their nuclear capacity goals are likely to be achieved.

4 Assessment of readiness and progress towards national targets for nuclear capacity

Nuclear energy’s contribution to climate change mitigation was formally recognized in the Global Stocktake document unanimously agreed at the COP28 climate change meeting held in 2023.

Nuclear’s contribution to enhancing energy security and strengthening the resilience of energy supply has also become increasingly recognized during the energy crises that have occurred in the 2020s.

The significant policy support and ambition for an increase in global nuclear energy development and production means that, if met, governments’ individual goals for future nuclear deployment would collectively lead to more than a tripling of global nuclear capacity by 2050, compared to 2020 levels.

The WNOR assessment framework evaluates countries’ progress towards their stated goals and their readiness to implement and deliver new-build programmes. Countries are at various stages of development; many start from very different positions, with different infrastructure development and degrees of nuclear ambition. Some have active long-term new build programmes with reactor construction industries capable of delivering several units simultaneously; others have mature nuclear institutions and infrastructure but little or no active new-build programmes; and a growing number are considering nuclear power for the first time.

4.1 Methodology of country assessments

Countries have been assessed against four criteria. The first three – Policy Framework Readiness; Institutional & Infrastructure Readiness; and Project & Programme Readiness – assess the readiness of countries to deliver new nuclear capacity. The fourth criterion – Target Achievability – assesses the likelihood that a country will be able to achieve the targets for future nuclear capacity set by their government.

Policy Framework Readiness considers whether there is sustained political commitment to nuclear energy and whether that commitment has been translated into a clear policy framework. This includes national capacity or generation objectives, nuclear roadmaps, integration with wider energy and climate policy, arrangements for financing and revenue support, and the degree to which government policy provides a stable basis for long-term investment.

Institutional & Infrastructure Readiness assesses whether the organizations and wider infrastructure required to support a nuclear programme are in place and capable of operating at the scale envisaged. This includes regulatory capability and independence, legislation and nuclear liability arrangements, implementing organizations, workforce and skills, supply chain capability, fuel cycle arrangements, waste and spent fuel management, decommissioning and other supporting nuclear infrastructure.

Project & Programme Readiness assesses the extent to which policy has been converted into identifiable and deliverable reactor projects. Indicators include site selection and site investigation, technology selection, vendor and EPC arrangements, licensing and environmental approvals, ownership and project management structures, financing and final investment decisions, long-lead procurement, site preparation and progress towards or beyond first nuclear concrete. The assessment considers not only the maturity of individual projects but whether there is a credible programme capable of delivering successive projects where national objectives require multiple reactors.

Target Achievability provides an overall assessment of the credibility of meeting the stated national nuclear objective. It considers the scale of the gap between existing and targeted capacity, the maturity and timing of the project pipeline, historical and current delivery performance, construction rates required, financing and industrial constraints, and whether sufficient projects have been identified to support the target. A country may therefore score strongly on the first three criteria but receive a lower rating here if its target requires a substantially greater rate of deployment than its current programme is capable of delivering. A low score might only be a reflection of a highly ambitious target and not a reflection of a country’s readiness to engage in a new build programme.

Each country was individually assessed against these four criteria, and the results of these assessments are presented in this report. However, this section analyses the collective results of different groupings of countries that are at similar stages of nuclear deployment, termed Pacesetters, Expanders, Restarters, Newcomers and Candidates. These different groupings are described and assessed in the next section.

Additionally, countries that currently have operable reactors that could potentially still be in operation in 2050, but which have no plans or targets for new nuclear construction are termed Maintainers. As these countries have no intention to start new nuclear build they are not included in this assessment, although their potential contribution to global nuclear capacity in 2050 is covered elsewhere in this report.

4.2 Pacesetters: countries with active serial-build programmes

Pacesetters: China, Russia, South Korea

Pacesetter countries have had long-term programmes of nuclear build in the past and are broadly expected to continue those programmes into the future. Nuclear development is usually supported by ongoing supportive policy, established institutions experienced in new construction proposals and ongoing licensing, construction and commissioning of new reactors.

Regulators, utilities, vendors and construction organizations can apply experience from one project to subsequent units. A continuing order book gives supply chains an incentive to retain skilled workers and invest in manufacturing. Project organizations can also retain expertise instead of rebuilding teams after long gaps in construction.

All Pacesetter countries have shown the value of fleet build of standardized designs, robust supply chains and experienced workforces, which has helped deliver more predictable project delivery schedules and control costs. Future expansion in these countries is more credible because an operating delivery system already exists.

Strong policy support has enabled the established long-term build programmes in these countries. The weakening of political support in South Korea earlier this decade created uncertainty and led to delays in its new build programme. Ongoing strong policy support will be necessary to enable these countries to continue to meet their nuclear capacity objectives.

For these countries, the priority is to maintain continuity of expertise and institutional capacity. Stable forward programmes give utilities and suppliers greater confidence to retain skilled workforces and invest in manufacturing.

4.3 Expanders: countries with active programmes

Expanders: Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, India, Iran, Pakistan, Slovakia, United Kingdom, United States

Expander countries have active or recent nuclear build, but have not maintained ongoing programmes of build over the longer term.

With ongoing operation of existing reactors and recent new build activity, Policy Framework Readiness and Institutional & Infrastructure Readiness to support licensing, construction and commissioning are often present, although not necessarily at the scale required for the targeted expansion of new-build programmes.

For these countries, the priority is to build on the momentum of the recent construction projects to achieve the benefits of serial build. If this can be achieved, Expander countries will transition to Pacesetter country status.

In North America, the United States and Canada have long-established nuclear industries, large operating fleets and significant technical capabilities. Both envisage a larger future role for nuclear, are supporting SMRs and advanced reactors, and remain committed to new large reactors. Extending existing fleet operating lifetimes can also make a significant contribution to their capacity goals.

Countries can be categorized as Expander countries even if they have had a long history of new nuclear build, if the scale of that new build is significantly smaller than what would be required to meet government goals, or if much larger new-build programmes are targeted. India is one such country. It has maintained an ongoing build programme, but after nearly six decades of power reactor operation its current 8 GWe of nuclear capacity remains relatively low, supplying just 3% of the country’s electricity. Meeting the government’s objective of 100 GWe by 2047 will require a substantial increase in construction. The key question is not whether India can construct and operate nuclear plants – it clearly can – but whether reactor deployment, financing and industrial production can scale fast enough to support the much larger programme envisaged.

France retains a large nuclear utility, domestic industrial capability and extensive regulatory experience. Its future capacity will depend on two related processes: the degree to which long-term operation is implemented for the existing fleet and the scale of the EPR2 programme.

In the United Kingdom, construction at Hinkley Point C is expected to be followed by Sizewell C and the initial SMR construction at Wylfa. Delivering the UK’s longer-term ambition will depend on these projects being part of an ongoing sequence rather than isolated investments.

Expander countries typically benefit from good existing institutional and infrastructure capacity, including for licensing and permitting. However, lack of ongoing new-build programmes has often meant that construction projects have been affected by first-of-a-kind issues such as significant project overruns and cost increases, such as those encountered at Hinkley Point C, Flamanville 3 and Vogtle 3&4.

To overcome these issues, Expander countries need to recognize the importance of an ongoing nuclear programme that can deliver the cost benefits of series build of standardized designs. An expanded nuclear build programme will require a framework that will allocate finance risk appropriately between public and private sectors. The accelerated pace of construction will require regulatory optimization to ensure there is sufficient capacity to accelerate licensing and permitting. An accelerated new-build programme will also require sufficient supply chain capacity and skills development.

4.4 Restarters: countries with operating nuclear plants that are rebuilding construction capability

Restarters: Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Japan, Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Ukraine

Restarter countries have substantial operating fleets and mature nuclear institutions but limited recent experience of continuous new construction.

Institutional & Infrastructure Readiness is often comparatively strong in these countries. They typically have experienced regulators, operating utilities, established nuclear legislation, nuclear sites, research organizations and arrangements for waste management and emergency preparedness. Many also retain substantial engineering and industrial capability. However, the focus of these institutions will be on the continued operation of existing plants, not the requirements of a new-build programme. For example, regulators may not be suitably equipped to assess new reactor designs.

These countries need to scale this institutional base to support the larger project pipelines required by their renewed national ambitions.

Much of the near-term contribution to capacity is likely to come from the existing fleet through operating lifetime extensions, refurbishment, uprates and potentially reactor restarts. New construction is progressing, but meeting longer-term ambitions will require a substantial increase in project throughput.

A similar pattern appears in West & Central Europe. Political support for nuclear power has strengthened in several countries, and some previous phase-out policies have been reversed or substantially modified. Governments are also increasingly considering direct involvement in financing or revenue-support arrangements. This creates a more supportive investment environment, but moving from strengthened policy support to repeated construction takes time.

Sweden and Belgium show how quickly policy can shift in favour of additional nuclear generation. The next step is to convert that policy support into durable project structures by identifying owners, sites, financing mechanisms for investment decisions.

Existing nuclear capability lowers many barriers, but constructing one reactor periodically requires different capabilities from managing several projects simultaneously. Regulators and project organizations may need to expand, while manufacturing facilities may require investment to support higher throughput.

Across this group, the priority is to move from project-specific solutions to programme-level arrangements. A financing mechanism created for one reactor may enable that project to proceed, but a national target requiring several projects needs a reusable framework. The same applies to licensing, supply-chain development and workforce planning.

Several countries in this group are considering large reactors, SMRs, advanced reactors, reactor restarts and operating lifetime extensions concomitantly. All can contribute to overall capacity goals, but pursuing multiple streams will require greater regulatory and industrial capacity.

SMRs could become an important route to renewed deployment. These countries have extensive nuclear infrastructure, technical capability and potential markets that favour deployment. The key transition will come when demonstration and first commercial projects lead to repeat orders. A stable order book will be important for long-term deployment.

The outlook for Restarters is positive. Much of the institutional infrastructure already exists. The principal opportunity is to convert existing capability and renewed policy support into continuous construction. If they do so, these countries could provide substantial additional capacity by 2050.

4.5 Newcomers: countries with a first nuclear project under construction or advanced development

Newcomers: Bangladesh, Belarus, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Poland, Türkiye, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan

Newcomer countries either have their first reactor under construction, have reached an advanced stage of preparation, with construction expected in the near term, or have completed their first plant construction within the last ten years.

A country’s first project is a critical transition point. It converts general policy commitments into decisions on ownership, technology, site development, financing, licensing and workforce preparation.

Türkiye and Bangladesh are well established in this category, with their first units expected to start-up in the next 12 months. Their first plants provide practical experience in developing and regulating multi-unit sites. Future projects at other sites can build on that experience.

Subsequent projects may involve different vendors, financing arrangements and technology partnerships. A priority should therefore be to ensure that experience from the first programme strengthens domestic institutions and transfers to later projects.

Poland has moved well beyond general consideration of nuclear power, with its first construction programme expected to begin in the next year or two.

The country has identified sites and technologies for its principal large-reactor programme and undertaken significant institutional preparation. A wider range of potential large-reactor and SMR projects have also been proposed by different organizations.

Kazakhstan is well advanced in its plans for its first reactor construction at Balkhash; Russia and Kazakhstan have signed an international construction agreement and export loan agreement.

For Newcomers with a defined first project, the main recommendation is to use that project as a platform for the programme that follows. Workforce development, regulatory learning, supply-chain participation and project-management capability should all be designed with future units in mind. If follow-on decisions wait until construction ends, much of the newly-developed workforce and supply chain may disperse. A staged programme, with future decisions prepared alongside the first project will help ensure that a transition into a larger fleet deployment can incorporate lessons-learned from the first project.

4.6 Candidates: countries actively planning new build

Candidates: Ecuador, Estonia, Ghana, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, Nigeria, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uganda, Vietnam

Candidate countries have decided that nuclear should form part of their future energy mix, distinguishing themselves from countries where nuclear is being evaluated as a future option.

For most of these countries this will first be established through a clear policy position. Beyond this milestone countries will establish programmes, begin site studies, develop regulatory institutions and enter discussions with potential vendors.

Southeast Asia contains a significant concentration of potential new entrants. Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Thailand are all advancing with nuclear energy playing a future role, although their programmes are at different stages.

Several have large and rapidly growing economies, substantial engineering and manufacturing sectors, experience with major infrastructure projects and broad technical expertise. Electricity demand is expected to rise substantially, while energy security, over-reliance on fossil fuel imports and decarbonization strengthen the case for nuclear energy.

Southeast Asian programmes therefore have significant long-term potential if political interest is converted into stable programme structures.

These countries should progress through institutional and project-development stages in ways that reflect their electricity systems. Reactor technology is only one part of the decision. Grid requirements, financing, domestic industrial participation, regulatory development, public engagement and ownership models will also determine appropriate technologies and project sizes.

For SMRs, smaller units may suit some electricity systems and allow programmes to grow incrementally, while others intend to pursue larger reactors. The regulatory, site, financing and workforce foundations required for nuclear power will remain valuable whichever technology is selected.

Regional cooperation would assist in the development of nuclear energy in Southeast Asia, and for other regions, such as Africa, Central Asia and Latin America. Regional cooperation can support programme development, cooperation on workforce training, regulatory knowledge, emergency planning, supply-chain qualification and technical education to help national programmes draw on a wider regional skills base.

High upfront capital costs are a challenge for nuclear projects everywhere, but in some Candidate countries the challenge is broader than financing a power plant alone. Such countries are simultaneously investing in electricity generation, transmission grids, distribution infrastructure, industrial development, transportation and other national priorities, all while facing constraints related to sovereign credit ratings and access to affordable long-term capital. This means that nuclear financing must be considered as part of a wider economic development and infrastructure strategy, rather than as a standalone energy project.

Nuclear can be a powerful part of that broader development agenda, but success will require innovative partnerships, patient capital and sustained international cooperation. Nuclear milestones should be linked to wider electricity-sector milestones. Site development, regulator capability, grid reinforcement and financing readiness can provide intermediate measures of progress before construction begins.

Where long-term nuclear requirements could be large, but programme capability is still developing, a manageable initial project can provide a stronger foundation than defining an entire multi-gigawatt fleet at the outset. This can establish the institutions and experience needed for later expansion.

In those countries in Africa and Central Asia that have significant uranium reserves and resources, linking uranium resources with the deployment of nuclear energy itself, creating the reliable, low-carbon power needed to support sustainable mining, manufacturing and other energy-intensive industries may present significant opportunities.

4.7 Assessment in the context of the capacity contribution

Figures 4.1-4.5 in the above assessment of the country groupings present the analysis with equal weighting for each country. However, the potential contribution made by countries to meeting the global tripling will be determined by the capacity each category contributes.

Figures 4.6-4.9 show capacity-weighted interpretations of the WNOR assessments. Note that the capacity-weighted assessments include reactor capacity in the categories: Under Construction, Planned, Proposed and Potential, as well as the additional capacity required to meet national targets. It does not include capacity associated with the continued operation of existing reactors.

The largest quantity of prospective nuclear capacity is associated with the Expander countries, with a total capacity of around 530 GWe, followed by Pacesetter countries, with a total capacity of just over 300 GWe.

While the Pacesetter countries are rated quite highly against all four criteria, Expanders are rated almost equally highly for Policy Framework Readiness and Institutional & Infrastructure Readiness, but much of the Expander capacity is not yet matched by equally strong rankings against the Project & Programme Readiness or Target Achievability criteria.

This shows that in many of the countries representing the largest prospective capacity, policy commitment is already comparatively strong, however the challenge will be to translate that commitment into specific, financed, licensed and repeatable projects at the pace required by national targets.

The ratings of the Restarters become progressively weaker from Policy Framework Readiness and Institutional & Infrastructure Readiness through to Project & Programme Readiness and Target Achievability. This is consistent with countries that retain nuclear knowledge and institutions but have not recently sustained serial construction programmes. For this group, the focus needs to be on rebuilding project pipelines, supply-chain capability, financing arrangements and experienced delivery organizations.

For Newcomers, the rankings for Policy Framework Readiness, Institutional & Infrastructure Readiness and Project & Programme Readiness are relatively high, but Target Achievability is ranked weaker.

The capacity contribution of Candidate countries is around 100 GWe. There is a great deal of variation in the rankings given to different countries, although rankings for Project & Programme Readiness and Target Achievability are lower overall. Much of the capacity in this category remains at an earlier stage where the decisions and institutions necessary for credible deployment have yet to be completed.

4.8 Common findings from country readiness assessments

The WNOR country assessments show that prospects for achieving national nuclear objectives – and collectively progressing towards tripling global nuclear capacity by 2050 – depend on many factors. For some countries there is high confidence they will be able to meet their targets, while others will require significant action to make sufficient progress.

Countries will follow different pathways, depending on their individual circumstances. The assessments cover programmes operating under very different political systems, electricity markets, industrial structures and financing models. For established nuclear countries and new entrants alike, targets can provide policy direction, but they become more credible when supported by institutions, financing frameworks, building supply chains, skilled workforces and identifiable projects.

There are also recognizable geographical patterns. In North America, the United States and Canada both combine substantial nuclear industries with renewed ambitions for expansion and considerable innovation in new nuclear technologies, such as a wider range of SMR designs. They are assessed to have recently transitioned from Restarter to Expander.

In Southeast Asia, several countries are currently Candidates but may soon transition to Newcomer status. Many have rapidly growing economies, sophisticated industrial sectors and broad technical capabilities that provide a solid foundation for nuclear development.

Several European countries are classified as Restarter countries – mature nuclear institutions and increasing political support, but a need to rebuild the supply chains and project-delivery capabilities required for sustained new construction.

The country readiness assessments identify a series of programme archetypes rather than a simple division between countries that are ‘ready’ and those that are not. Each has different strengths and would benefit from different actions to improve delivery of national objectives.

4.9 Implications for the global tripling objective

The global challenge is not evenly distributed among dozens of countries. A very large share of the capacity that would contribute to expansion is concentrated in a relatively small number of Expanders and Pacesetters. Consequently, the global outcome will depend disproportionately on whether Pacesetters can maintain high build rates, while Expanders convert large policy ambitions into committed project pipelines and sustained construction programmes.

Newcomers and Candidates will contribute to broadening nuclear deployment geographically and creating growth beyond the existing nuclear markets, but in absolute capacity terms they cannot compensate by themselves for major under-delivery among the large Expander programmes.

4.10 Interpreting country capacity target assessments

The low rankings of some Expander countries for achieving their national capacity target goals does not necessarily mean that those countries will not have a significant quantity of additional nuclear capacity by 2050. Countries such as the USA and India have very high 2050 capacity goals, which are currently assessed as unlikely to be met. At the same time, they are expected to make significant contributions to achieving the global tripling target.

4.11 Opportunities to strengthen delivery

Across the WNOR country assessments, several recommendations apply to countries at different stages of nuclear development.

First, long-term targets should be translated into near to intermediate-term programme milestones, such as site selection, financing decisions, licensing applications, first concrete, commissioning of initial projects and subsequent orders.

These milestones allow progress towards the tripling objective to be measured through observable programme development well before the target year.

Second, programme continuity matters across almost every category. Serial builders need it to preserve their advantage. Mature nuclear countries need it to rebuild construction capability. Intermittent builders need it to increase deployment rates. New entrants need it to retain expertise and capabilities developed for their first project.

A programme of several units built in a reasonably continuous sequence may be easier to sustain industrially than the same number of reactors delivered as unrelated projects over several decades.

Third, institutional capacity must match the scale of the objective. The question is not simply whether a country has a regulator, an owner-operator or an engineering supply chain, but whether those organizations can realistically support the number and variety of projects envisaged.

For established nuclear countries, this may mean expanding existing organizations. For newcomers, it may mean ensuring that institutions created for the first project can develop into permanent national organizations. In both cases, workforce planning will become increasingly important as more countries expand nuclear programmes simultaneously.

Fourth, financing should be treated as a programme capability, not only a project requirement. Financing must be designed into a nuclear project from its inception, rather than treated as an afterthought. The objective should be to move beyond bespoke financing for individual plants and establish standardised, repeatable frameworks that enable nuclear projects to access mainstream infrastructure finance at scale. Standardisation, fleet deployment and successful repetition should reduce perceived risk, transaction costs and the cost of capital.

Fifth, technology strategy and programme strategy must be considered together. Large reactors, SMRs and advanced reactors may all have roles, but each additional technology adds demands on regulators, utilities and supply chains. Countries with sufficient scale may sustain several technology streams; others may benefit from greater standardization, particularly during early programme development.

This is particularly relevant to countries considering SMRs as a significant part of future capacity. SMRs may offer advantages where smaller unit size, incremental deployment or industrial applications matter. Their contribution will become more credible as first projects enter construction and lead to repeat orders. Countries can prepare by developing technology-neutral elements of nuclear readiness – sites, regulation, workforce, financing frameworks and grid planning – without determining every aspect of the eventual reactor fleet.

Finally, maintaining existing nuclear capacity is important alongside developing new projects. In countries with mature fleets, operating lifetime extension can make a major contribution to capacity available in 2050. Continued operation also preserves skills, operating organizations, sites and supply chains that can support future construction.

4.12 Progress towards tripling nuclear capacity

Established nuclear countries are reconsidering expansion, several governments have reversed earlier restrictions on new nuclear development, and a growing number of new entrants are incorporating nuclear power into long-term energy strategies.

This broadening of interest matters because tripling global capacity is unlikely to depend on one region or one reactor technology. Different groups of countries are also likely to contribute at different stages.

Active serial builders are best placed to add significant capacity in the near and medium term because they already have functioning delivery systems. Mature nuclear countries could contribute increasingly as financing arrangements, supply chains and project pipelines develop. New entrants can add further capacity during the 2030s and 2040s, while emerging programmes represent an important source of longer-term growth.

For serial-build countries, the priority is to maintain continuity, standardization and an investable project pipeline. Mature nuclear countries need to convert renewed policy support and strong institutions into repeatable financing and construction programmes. New entrants need to move from policy commitment through institutional development to a well-defined first project, while using that project to build capabilities for subsequent deployment.

5 Policy Recommendations for Tripling Global Nuclear Capacity

Achieving national nuclear energy ambitions and contributing to the global goal of tripling nuclear capacity by 2050 (compared with 2020 capacity) will require action across policy, finance, regulation, industrial delivery, fuel supply, workforce development and public engagement. The recommendations below describe how to overcome common barriers to deployment and recommend actions for governments, regulators, industry, financial institutions and international organizations to help meet the tripling goal.

5.1 Energy and Sustainable Economic Development Policy

Governments can create national and international policy frameworks that specifically recognize nuclear's contribution to energy security, sustainability and socio-economic growth.

5.1.1 Articulating long-term national commitment to nuclear energy

Clear articulation of the strategic importance of nuclear energy within long-term national energy policy, and its role in contributing to national energy, industrial, economic and social development objectives will strengthen alignment between energy system planning and industrial capability development.

Multi-decade deployment pipelines will provide confidence for long-term investment, enabling the nuclear industry to scale capabilities, reduce costs, and deliver projects more efficiently.

5.1.2 Recognizing nuclear’s contribution to energy security

To ensure long-term resilience of the energy system, the transition to a clean and sustainable low-carbon economy will require a diversified energy mix providing security of supply, dispatchable power and critical infrastructure resilience. Nuclear energy’s contribution to achieving these goals should be recognized in energy and industrial policies.

5.1.3 Supporting nuclear energy in international frameworks, including those addressing climate change

Governments and international organizations can help ensure that countries choosing to use nuclear energy have access to relevant policy support, financing mechanisms, technical cooperation and capacity-building initiatives by explicitly articulating the strategic importance of nuclear energy within international policy, regulations and standards. World Nuclear Association also recommends that, where governments pursue harmonization of different national climate and environmental regulations, these harmonized regulations recognize the value of nuclear energy.

5.2 Financing and Market Design

Governments and the nuclear industry should work together to create a favourable investment environment for nuclear energy as a strategic national asset.

5.2.1 Minimizing political risk through long-term policy commitment

Consistent policy frameworks that provide clear, long-term assurances of a government’s commitment to nuclear power are essential to reducing risk and attracting nuclear investment. Such commitments will help lower financing costs and encourage private sector participation.

5.2.2 Establishing financing frameworks with appropriate risk sharing

To enable the large upfront capital investment required for nuclear projects, funding mechanisms should be established that allocate risk appropriately between public and private actors, taking into account the long-term benefits to both. Such frameworks should help close financing gaps and reflect the long-term economic and societal benefits of nuclear infrastructure.

5.2.3 Designing energy and electricity markets to reflect nuclear system value and support long-term investment and capacity value

Electricity markets should be reformed to recognize the system costs associated with each generation technology and enable nuclear to compete on equal terms. This should include mechanisms to reward low-carbon generation, reliability, system services, and long-term capacity contributions and provide stable long-term revenue signals. This will support investment decisions and enable sustained deployment.

5.2.4 Mobilizing a full range of public, private and multilateral financial institutions to support nuclear deployment

Ensuring availability of financing and facilitating risk assessment processes will encourage nuclear investment, particularly in nuclear newcomer countries. Multilateral development banks can provide catalytic investment that attracts private capital.

Governments, through their role in setting the lending policies of multilateral development banks, can ensure that those financial institutions provide assessment and due diligence services that facilitate private investment in nuclear energy.

Given their mandate, multilateral development banks could also consider establishing dedicated technical assistance programmes, offering grant-based financing for institutional capacity building – particularly the preparation of regulatory frameworks, staff training, and public education on the benefits of nuclear energy in nuclear newcomer countries.

Multilateral development banks could also complement government guarantees to reduce risk and enable broader participation, for example by underwriting those guarantees.

Export credit institutions are able to help reduce the financing risk and cost of nuclear projects, particularly where equipment, technology or services are supplied internationally. They can provide or guarantee long-term debt, cover political and sovereign risks, and support repayment periods better aligned with the long construction and operating life of nuclear plants. This can improve lender confidence, lower interest costs and help attract additional commercial finance.

5.2.5 Including nuclear energy in climate and sustainable finance frameworks

Recognizing nuclear energy’s low-carbon and sustainability credentials in sustainable finance frameworks will help enable access to green finance. Some governments and nuclear utilities have issued green bonds for investment for nuclear energy.

Climate and sustainable finance frameworks must fully recognize the long-term sustainable attributes of nuclear energy. This will enable stronger cooperation between the industry and financial institutions and unlock access to green and sustainable finance.

5.3 Regulation and Permitting

World Nuclear Association recommends optimizing the regulatory process, particularly where reactors are being deployed in multiple jurisdictions, and ensuring that regulators have the mandate and resources to carry out their duties in a timely manner.

5.3.1 Streamlining the regulatory process across jurisdictions

Greater coordination between regulatory frameworks should be pursued to streamline the review and approval of reactor designs across jurisdictions. More efficient regulatory processes can reduce unnecessary duplication and accelerate deployment while maintaining high standards of nuclear safety.

A coordinated approach to nuclear infrastructure development, licensing and permitting can optimize the use of regulatory resources, shorten project timelines and lower costs without compromising safety. These efforts can draw on the experience of countries that have successfully deployed standardized reactor designs across multiple sites, using repeatable licensing approaches to improve efficiency and reduce both approval times and costs.

5.3.2 Adopting risk-informed and proportionate regulatory approaches

Application of regulatory frameworks should be proportionate to safety risks, to avoid inefficiencies and unnecessary costs that would otherwise divert resources away from safety-significant issues.

The risk calculation should also take account of the benefits of nuclear technology to society, including the avoidance of external risks posed by technologies that would otherwise be deployed in its place.

By adopting technology-neutral, risk-informed, and goal-oriented approaches, regulators can focus on safety-significant risks and ensure proportionate application of principles such as ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) or ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable).

5.3.3 Pursuing international cooperation to leverage existing regulatory assessment and approvals

Optimizing design review processes across jurisdictions will reduce delays, lower costs, and increase efficiency in nuclear deployment.

World Nuclear Association recommends improved cooperation between national and international regulatory agencies, for example by carrying out joint reviews or maximizing the use of design review work already undertaken by credible international counterparts. Design changes should be limited to site-specific requirements to preserve standardization.

5.3.4 Streamlining and coordinating regulatory approaches to nuclear infrastructure development and permitting

Nuclear development often involves multiple national regulatory bodies, covering planning, safety and environmental requirements.

Governments can promote a coordinated regulatory approach to facilitate a streamlined decision-making process for nuclear development, licensing and permitting that will allow for lowering the cost of nuclear without impacting safety.

5.4 Optimizing the Use of Existing Reactors

Maximizing the contribution of existing nuclear capacity through lifetime extension, uprates, reactor restarts and proportionate regulation.

5.4.1 Extending operations and uprating existing capacity

Many currently operable reactors could deliver additional generation through capacity uprates and through extending planned operating lifetimes. Such measures represent the most cost-effective forms of additional low-carbon generation.

5.4.2 Supporting the restart of reactors

Restarting reactors that have closed before the end of their technically achievable operating lives because of policy decisions, market conditions or other non-technical factors will help to maximize secure, low-carbon generation.

Collaboration between governments, institutional investors and the nuclear industry can support the engineering and associated works required to restart such reactors.

5.4.3 Ensuring regulatory proportionality is applied to long-term operation

Regulating the lifetime extension of existing nuclear reactors requires a balance between safety oversight and the efficient use of existing low-carbon assets. Regulatory proportionality ensures that the administrative burden on operators reflects the actual level of risk, enabling plants to safely extend operation.

5.5 Nuclear Technology Development and Deployment

Accelerating nuclear deployment through proven reactor designs, innovative SMRs and wider decarbonization applications

5.5.1 Utilizing commercially available nuclear reactor designs to accelerate near-term deployment

There is an urgent need to scale nuclear capacity if countries are to meet rising electricity demand, strengthen energy security and achieve deep decarbonization. While advanced and emerging reactor technologies will play an important role in the mid- to long-term, commercially available reactor designs offer the most immediate pathway for deploying new nuclear capacity at scale.

Proven large reactor technologies already have operating experience, established supply chains, mature licensing bases and a track record of delivering substantial volumes of reliable, low-carbon electricity. Prioritizing the deployment of these designs can reduce technology risk, support more predictable project development and enable countries to move more quickly from policy ambition to construction and operation.

By deploying proven technologies now, countries can add significant clean firm capacity while also building the regulatory, workforce, supply chain and project management capabilities needed to support future reactor technologies.

5.5.2 Accelerating SMR deployment

Small modular reactors (SMRs) and other advanced nuclear technologies offer the potential to simplify project delivery, reduce capital requirements per unit, and support more investable nuclear deployment models. Their smaller unit size, modular construction and potential for factory manufacture could enable greater standardization, shorter construction schedules, and more flexible financing structures.

Many SMR and advanced reactor designs still require further development, licensing, demonstration and first-of-a-kind deployment before these potential benefits can be fully realized. Governments can help accelerate the transition from development to deployment through targeted R&D support, licensing reform, public–private partnerships, and funding mechanisms that support demonstration and early projects.

5.5.3 Expanding the role of SMRs and advanced nuclear technologies in wider decarbonization applications

Nuclear technologies can be used for many applications beyond grid electricity production, such as industrial heat supply, district heating, desalination, sustainable synthetic fuel production, marine transport, remote grids - including remote coastal sites - and off-grid energy supply. SMRs and advanced nuclear technologies will further expand the opportunities to meet these needs.

World Nuclear Association recommends that governments support the inclusion of non-power and wider decarbonization applications in demonstration and first-of-a-kind projects, including through public-private partnerships, targeted funding, and policy frameworks that recognize the value of nuclear energy across hard-to-abate sectors.

5.6 Uranium and Fuel Supply

Securing resilient nuclear fuel supply chains, from uranium resources and front end services to advanced fuel development.

5.6.1 Supporting uranium exploration and resource development

Future nuclear expansion will require significantly increased uranium supply. If uranium exploration and mine development do not expand this could create supply constraints. Availability of supply depends on timely investment and project execution, given the long lead times required for the development of uranium mines.

To ensure a resilient fuel supply chain aligned with future nuclear expansion, it would be helpful to set clear targets and timelines for uranium exploration and resource development.

World Nuclear Association recommends that governments support uranium exploration and development programmes to secure long-term supply. This will ensure availability of resources to meet future demand in a timely manner.  In addition, regulatory authorities should ensure timely completion of the licensing and permitting processes where mines are being developed.

5.6.2 Expanding front end fuel cycle capacity and resilience

Tripling nuclear capacity will require major expansion of fuel cycle services, including conversion, enrichment, and fabrication. Without early action, bottlenecks may emerge, where there is insufficient fuel cycle capacity to meet the needs of the additional generation capacity projected in this report.

Governments and the industry could collaborate to set targets for increasing global conversion and enrichment capacity to ensure progress and adaptability. Geographic diversification could enhance the resilience of the supply of fuel cycle services.

World Nuclear Association recommends governments support the industry in making early investment decisions to expand fuel cycle services capacity to ensure the continuity and stability of nuclear fuel supply.

5.6.3 Accelerate development of fuels for advanced technologies and SMRs

Innovative fuel designs can improve reactor performance, safety margins and fuel cycle economics. Higher burnup fuels, longer fuel cycles, accident-tolerant fuel concepts, new cladding materials and advanced fuel compositions may support improved reliability and more efficient operation of both existing reactors and future designs. Many advanced SMR designs involve the use of new fuel types, including higher burnup and higher enrichment (LEU+ and HALEU, high assay low-enriched uranium).

World Nuclear Association recommends that governments, regulators and the industry support qualification, testing and licensing pathways for innovative fuel designs, while ensuring that fuel innovation is aligned with reactor deployment plans and fuel cycle infrastructure. World Nuclear Association also recommends that governments work with the industry on the development and deployment of new fuels and required fuel cycle facilities, to produce and manufacture these fuels to ensure their timely availability, as well as considering the entire fuel cycle, including recycling or used fuel management.

5.7 Reprocessing and Recycling

Adopting a policy of reprocessing and recycling used nuclear fuel can promote adoption of the circular economy, would make more efficient use of nuclear resources, enhance fuel security and reduce waste volumes. For those governments that have a policy of reprocessing used nuclear fuel, the following actions will enhance its deployment.

5.7.1 Establishing long-term policy support for reprocessing and recycling

Where chosen, reprocessing and recycling should be supported consistently by policy frameworks. World Nuclear Association recommends that governments establish clear, long-term policy support for these activities that promotes integrated planning across reactor types. This will enable better use of existing fuel and support future technologies, improve uranium utilization and reduce waste volumes and radiotoxicity.

5.7.2 Providing predictable regulatory pathways for advanced fuel cycles

Regulatory certainty can accelerate the development of advanced reprocessing technologies. This removes barriers to innovation and deployment.

World Nuclear Association recommends that regulatory frameworks provide predictable and streamlined licensing pathways. This will support development of advanced fuel cycle technologies.

5.8 Waste Management, Disposal and Decommissioning

Establishing comprehensive, integrated and, where appropriate, multinational solutions for long-term radioactive waste and used fuel management.

5.8.1 Establish comprehensive long-term waste management plans

Effective waste management is essential for public acceptance and long-term sustainability.

The preparation and adoption of long-term management strategies will help ensure adequate funds are accumulated during plant operating lifetimes. These should address all waste streams from operation and decommissioning, including management and disposal of high-level radioactive waste and used fuel not selected for recycling/reprocessing . World Nuclear Association also recommends that integrated approaches covering storage, transport, disposal, and recycling options be adopted. This will ensure a coherent and sustainable waste strategy.

5.8.2 Considering multinational shared infrastructure facility solutions

Some countries may lack the scale or resources to develop national repositories and associated fuel cycle facilities independently. This can significantly delay progress on long-term disposal solutions.

World Nuclear Association recommends that governments consider multinational and regional infrastructure solutions, including shared reprocessing and recycling services, multinational interim storage facilities, regional or multinational deep geological repositories (DGRs) and other disposal concepts.

Such shared approaches can provide more efficient, cost-effective, and secure solutions for long-term waste management. They enable economies of scale, reduce the number of disposal sites, enhance safety and security, and are particularly beneficial for countries with small or new nuclear programmes, as well as for managing waste from SMRs and advanced reactors.

5.9 Increasing the Capability and Capacity of the Nuclear Supply Chain

Strengthen and diversify global nuclear supply chains to enable efficient, timely and scalable deployment.

5.9.1 Strengthening and expanding nuclear supply chain capabilities

Ensuring sufficient supply chain capacity and relevant engineering, construction and manufacturing capabilities will facilitate the timely deployment of nuclear projects at the scale required to triple global nuclear capacity by 2050, by removing gaps in skilled labour, component manufacturing, and qualified suppliers.

By working together, governments and the industry can provide long-term procurement pipelines that function as credible investment signals for suppliers to ensure timely delivery of critical systems.

5.9.2 Aligning procurement requirements and standards

Different national procurement requirements, codes and standards for nuclear equipment create inefficiencies, increase costs and limit the scalability of nuclear technologies across markets. These differences can lead to duplication in design, testing and certification.

Regulators, the nuclear industry and standards development organizations can address this by working together to align and mutually recognize codes and standards where possible. Strengthening international collaboration can promote standardization of procurement requirements and enable a more efficient global supply chain.

5.9.3 Leveraging the capabilities, best practices and products from other sectors

Adoption of proven technologies from other sectors could help broaden supplier participation, lower costs, and reduce project timelines, particularly where equivalent industrial-grade components meet performance and safety requirements.

Adopting risk-informed, performance-based approaches will allow for the use of suitably qualified industrial-grade equipment. Clear guidance and harmonized qualification processes should be developed to ensure safety is maintained while broadening the supplier base and improving project efficiency.

5.10 Industrial Policy and Programme Delivery

Integrate nuclear deployment into industrial strategies and adopt coordinated, programmatic delivery models to strengthen economic benefits, reduce costs and accelerate fleet deployment.

5.10.1 Enhancing industrial and socio-economic development

Nuclear power projects are major infrastructure investments that can contribute to regional economic development, high-value employment, industrial capability and long-term social value. World Nuclear Association recommends that governments integrate nuclear deployment into wider industrial strategies, including local and regional supply chain development, workforce planning, infrastructure investment and export opportunities.

5.10.2 Adopting a programmatic approach to project delivery

A programmatic approach that leverages a fleet approach, the project team, experience and lessons learned, standardized designs and industrial deployment strategies would improve efficiency, reduce costs and accelerate delivery.

5.10.3 Ensuring efficient project execution and delivery model

Nuclear programmes and projects are major infrastructure endeavours involving numerous organizations, with contracting models that allocate and share risks throughout the supply chain. Governments, project owners, vendors and supply chain partners can help accelerate these programmes by establishing clear delivery models before project commitment, including defined roles, accountabilities and decision-making processes.

World Nuclear Association recommends that project owners develop strong programme management capability, adopt proven designs where possible, use realistic schedules and cost estimates, and ensure that contracts incentivize collaboration rather than adversarial risk transfer. Early supply chain engagement, workforce planning, and lessons learned from previous nuclear and major infrastructure projects should be embedded from the outset.

5.10.4 Exploring options for collaboration to accelerate nuclear fleet deployment

World Nuclear Association recommends that developers and other stakeholders – including the nuclear industry, international and regional organizations – increase international collaboration to share lessons learned and coordinate actions to mutually accelerate deployment. 

This can include programmatic procurement and sharing good practice for multiple nuclear deployment to accelerate bringing units online, reduce costs and optimize supply chain and workforce mobility.

5.11 Workforce and Skills Development

Building a future-ready nuclear workforce will require long-term programme certainty, integrated workforce planning, expanded training and education, skills mobility, retraining and developing an early-career talent pipeline.

5.11.1 Providing long-term clarity that gives employers the confidence to invest

Greater certainty around future nuclear programmes will encourage workforce investment and development.

Governments should establish clear, credible and long-term project pipelines that give the industry the confidence to invest in workforce development at scale and build a future-ready workforce.

5.11.2 Integrating workforce planning into nuclear project delivery

A shortage of skilled workers would represent a major constraint on nuclear deployment. Workforce readiness should therefore be treated as a core part of nuclear programme and project delivery, rather than as a separate education or human resources issue.

Governments and project developers should integrate workforce planning into nuclear programmes from their earliest stages and maintain it throughout project delivery. National nuclear roadmaps should identify the skills and capabilities that will be required at each stage of delivery, including policy development, licensing, construction, commissioning, operations, the fuel cycle, regulation and decommissioning.

5.11.3 Transferring international expertise

Governments and the industry should develop international recruitment and skills-mobility arrangements that allow experienced personnel to support nuclear programmes where their expertise is needed. International recruitment will provide lasting benefits only where imported expertise is used to strengthen domestic capabilities.

Nuclear programmes should include structured arrangements through which internationally recruited personnel transfer their knowledge and experience to the local workforce.

Regional centres linking industry, academia and training providers will support coordinated skills development and innovation, improving effectiveness and knowledge sharing.

5.11.4 Creating transfer and retraining pathways from adjacent sectors

The nuclear sector will need to attract experienced workers from related industries, including defence, oil and gas, aerospace, advanced manufacturing, major infrastructure, digital and cybersecurity.

Transferable skills should be supported by structured nuclear conversion pathways covering nuclear safety culture, regulatory expectations and quality requirements.

5.11.5 Strengthening nuclear education outreach

In many regions, the nuclear sector faces a shortage of young people entering the workforce, including a decline in the number of students choosing nuclear-related degrees. This is intensified by increased competition for STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) talent.

Governments, industry and educational institutions should develop systematic and sustained nuclear education outreach programmes that build awareness of nuclear science, technology and career opportunities among young people.

Effective outreach requires specialist skills and an understanding of how to communicate with different groups of young people. Nuclear organizations should provide thematic training and practical support for the professionals responsible for designing and delivering youth engagement activities.

5.12 Public Confidence and Engagement

Building public confidence through inclusive stakeholder engagement, balanced understanding, meaningful participation and accessible information.

5.12.1 Build understanding of nuclear energy’s benefits and risks

Public discussion of nuclear energy can focus disproportionately on individual risks without providing sufficient information on its potential benefits or comparison with alternative energy options. This can prevent stakeholders from forming a balanced understanding of the choices involved.

World Nuclear Association recommends that governments, industry and independent institutions provide clear, evidence-based and accessible information on both the benefits and risks of nuclear energy. Communications should place nuclear energy within the wider energy-system and industrial-policy context, enabling informed consideration of the full range of impacts and opportunities.

5.12.2 Undertake comprehensive stakeholder mapping

Effective engagement begins with a clear understanding of the individuals, communities and organizations that may be affected by, interested in, or able to influence nuclear energy policies and projects.

World Nuclear Association recommends that governments and project developers undertake stakeholder mapping at the earliest stages of programme and project development. This should identify local communities, elected representatives, civil society organizations, businesses, trade unions, educational institutions, indigenous peoples where applicable, and other relevant groups. Stakeholder mapping should be regularly updated as projects develop and should inform tailored, inclusive and sustained engagement strategies.

5.12.3 Enabling meaningful community participation

Community engagement should extend beyond the provision of information or consultation after major decisions have already been taken. Communities are more likely to have confidence in nuclear projects where they have meaningful opportunities to influence decisions that affect them.

World Nuclear Association recommends that governments and project developers establish participatory engagement processes from the earliest stages of site selection, policy development and project planning. Communities should be given clear opportunities to express their priorities. Engagement should be continuous before construction as well as throughout construction, operation and decommissioning, with clear explanations of how community input has influenced decisions.

5.12.4 Improving access to information

Access to reliable and clear information can contribute to overcoming misconceptions and increasing confidence in nuclear energy.

World Nuclear Association recommends that governments integrate nuclear energy information and education into wider energy, skills and industrial strategies. This should clearly communicate the full opportunity associated with nuclear development, including employment, supply-chain participation, regional investment, research, innovation and applications beyond electricity generation.

6 Director General’s Conclusions

The challenge is now one of delivery. Global energy demand is rising as populations grow and economies electrify, while emissions must fall sharply. Meeting both objectives will require a major expansion of clean, reliable energy, with nuclear power playing a significant part.

At COP28 in 2023, 25 countries committed to work towards tripling global nuclear capacity by 2050. That number has since risen to 38. The priority now is to turn political ambition into programmes, projects, operating capacity and ultimately energy delivered to society

Tripling will require action across the whole nuclear system: preserving the existing fleet, completing reactors already under construction, accelerating deployment of proven large reactors, bringing SMRs and advanced reactors into commercial operation, and enabling new countries to establish successful nuclear programmes.

6.1 Build the deployment pipeline now

The required increase in construction is substantial. In recent years, annual nuclear additions have typically been below 10 GWe. Even at the historic peak in the 1980s, annual additions only briefly exceeded 30 GWe. Delivering the tripling ambition will eventually require annual additions well above those historic levels.

That scale of deployment cannot be created quickly.

Reactors already under construction and mature projects will provide much of the growth this decade. Capacity commissioned in the 2030s will depend increasingly on decisions being taken now on project development, financing, licensing, manufacturing and workforce. Deployment in the 2040s will need to build on repeat projects, standardised designs, mature supply chains and experienced delivery organisations.

Governments and industry therefore need to act before capacity is urgently required. Countries expecting to need nuclear capacity in the 2030s and 2040s should establish programmes, sites, regulatory resources and financing arrangements now.

This matters because nuclear expansion will take place alongside rapidly increasing electricity demand from electrification, data centres, cooling, desalination, hydrogen and industrial decarbonisation. New nuclear capacity will be needed both to replace unabated fossil generation and to help meet growth in total low-carbon electricity demand. It can also provide reliable heat for sectors that are difficult to decarbonise through electricity alone.

6.2 Protect and make full use of the existing fleet

The first priority should be to make full use of the nuclear capacity already available.

Existing reactors provide proven low-carbon generation together with valuable infrastructure: established sites, transmission connections, skilled workforces, experienced operating organisations and reliable supply chains. Where continued operation can meet regulatory requirements, there is a strong case for avoiding premature closures.

Governments, operators and regulators should therefore:

• enable long-term operation where plants can continue to meet safety requirements;
• pursue economically and technically justified power uprates;
• improve plant performance and reduce avoidable outages;
• assess the potential to restart suitable reactors that have closed prematurely; and
• prioritise timely completion and commissioning of reactors already under construction.

Every gigawatt retained, uprated, restarted or completed reduces the amount of entirely new capacity that must subsequently be developed.

6.3 Move proven designs into repeat deployment

Preserving the existing fleet will not be enough. Tripling will require sustained new construction.

Large reactors based on proven designs are likely to provide most of the additional nuclear capacity over the near and medium term. Their contribution will be greatest where we move away from isolated projects and establish repeat-build programmes that capture experience from one unit to the next.

Governments, utilities, project developers, or large energy users should therefore identify credible sequences of projects rather than treating each reactor as a separate decision. Vendors should standardise designs and avoid unnecessary project-specific changes. Supply chains need sufficient visibility of future orders to justify investment in manufacturing capacity and workforce.

SMRs and other advanced technologies can broaden the contribution of nuclear energy. They may provide new options for smaller grids, industrial facilities, remote locations and heat applications. Their contribution will depend on how quickly first projects can be converted into repeat commercial deployment.

The issue is not whether countries should choose large reactors or SMRs. The priority is to deploy technologies suited to national needs and to do so in ways that support repeatability, standardisation and learning.

6.4 Put workable delivery models in place

There is no single model for nuclear deployment. Countries have different resource endowments, electricity markets, institutions, industrial capabilities and financing systems.

What matters is whether each country has a framework capable of supporting investment over the full life of a nuclear project.

In centrally coordinated systems, governments and state-owned utilities can integrate nuclear development with long-term electricity planning, grid investment and industrial strategy. In competitive markets, additional arrangements may be needed to provide predictable long-term revenues and to recognise the wider value of firm low-carbon generation, system stability and energy security.

Financing arrangements should allocate risks to the parties best able to manage them. Placing risks on investors or consumers who cannot control them increases financing costs and can undermine projects.

Countries should therefore establish credible revenue, financing and risk-allocation frameworks before projects reach final investment decisions.

6.5 Strengthen the global supply chain

Tripling nuclear capacity will require an industrial base capable of supporting much higher and more sustained construction rates.

Governments and industry should provide enough visibility of future project pipelines to support investment in:

• component manufacturing;
• construction capacity;
• uranium exploration, mining, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication;
• specialist engineering;
• transport and logistics; and
• nuclear-qualified suppliers.

International supply chains will remain essential. New entrant countries should make use of experienced international vendors and operators rather than attempting to recreate every capability domestically from the outset.

Countries planning sustained programmes should also identify where domestic capability can reduce delivery risk and create long-term economic value. The objective should be resilient international supply chains combined with realistic national localisation.

6.6 Expand the workforce before shortages become a constraint

A larger nuclear programme will require more people across almost every part of the sector.

Governments, industry and educational institutions should quantify future workforce needs and expand training before construction activity accelerates. Particular attention is needed for occupations where experience takes years to develop, including regulators, nuclear safety specialists, project managers, operators and nuclear-qualified construction personnel.

Countries restarting nuclear construction after long gaps should not assume that an existing operating fleet automatically provides the skills needed for major new-build programmes.

International mobility, common training standards and transfer of experience between mature and emerging programmes can help, but they cannot replace sustained investment in national skills.

6.7 Equip regulators for expansion

Regulatory capacity must grow alongside industry capacity.

Faster deployment does not require lower safety standards. It requires regulators with sufficient people, expertise and predictable processes to assess projects efficiently.

Governments should ensure that regulators have the resources needed to deal simultaneously with existing fleet oversight, lifetime extensions, new reactors and emerging technologies.

Regulators should also increase international cooperation, particularly for designs being deployed in several countries. Greater use of previous regulatory assessments, while retaining national responsibility for safety decisions, can reduce unnecessary duplication and help successful designs move more efficiently between markets.

6.8 Help new nuclear countries move from ambition to projects

A growing number of countries are considering or developing their first nuclear power programmes. Their successful entry will be important if nuclear deployment is to expand geographically as well as increase in established markets.

These countries need to move systematically from political commitment to project development.

That means establishing:

• durable national policy;
• competent implementing organisations;
• independent regulatory capability;
• realistic sites and technology options;
• financing and ownership arrangements;
• fuel and waste strategies; and
• credible schedules.

International organisations, experienced nuclear countries and industry should support these programmes through practical transfer of knowledge, regulatory cooperation, training and partnership.

The aim should be to help new entrants benefit from existing experience rather than requiring each country to recreate the same institutions, processes and lessons independently.

6.9 Resolve fuel and waste requirements as programmes expand

Fuel security and waste management need to be planned at the same scale as reactor deployment.

Rapid expansion of nuclear capacity will require corresponding increases in uranium mining, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication. Advanced reactor programmes may require new fuel types and manufacturing capability.

Governments and industry should identify these requirements early enough for capacity to be developed ahead of reactor demand.

The same applies to spent fuel and radioactive waste. Existing storage arrangements provide time, but countries planning substantial fleet expansion should establish credible long-term used fuel and waste management strategies and make measurable progress towards disposal solutions.

6.10 Move from individual projects to sustained programmes

The WNOR assessments show a consistent pattern: nuclear capacity is more likely to grow where countries maintain sustained programmes rather than rely on isolated projects.

Stable programmes allow experience to accumulate. They support investment in people and manufacturing. They make it possible to repeat designs, retain delivery organisations and give governments, regulators, investors and suppliers confidence that capability developed for one project will be needed again.

The priority for the coming decade should therefore be to convert national ambitions into credible pipelines of projects.

Industry needs to improve project execution, standardisation and productivity. Governments need to provide durable policy, financing and market frameworks. Regulators need sufficient resources to handle growing workloads efficiently. Financial institutions need models that reflect the long operating lives and system value of nuclear assets. Educational institutions need to expand the workforce, and local communities need to see clear benefits from hosting projects.

Tripling nuclear capacity by 2050 remains achievable, but it will depend on decisions being taken well before the capacity is needed.

The immediate priorities are clear: preserve the existing fleet, complete projects already under way, commit to the next projects, establish repeat programmes, and invest in the institutions, people and supply chains needed to sustain deployment at scale.

Dr Sama Bilbao y León
Director General, World Nuclear Association
September 2026